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A CONSTITUTIONAL BIRTHRIGHT: THE STATE, PARENTAGE, 
AND THE RIGHTS OF NEWBORN PERSONS 
* James G. Dwyer 
State parentage laws, dictating who a newborn child's first legal parents will be, 
have been the subject of constitutional challenges in several U.S. Supreme Court 
and many lower court decisions. All of those decisions, however, have focused on 
constitutional rights of adults (especially unwed biological fathers) who wish to become, 
or to avoid becoming, legal parents. Neither courts nor legal scholars have considered 
whether the children have any constitutional rights that constrain legislatures and courts 
in deciding which adults will be their legal parents. If a state enacted a parentage 
law that said, for example, that any child born to a birth mother who already had 
two children would be placed in a parent-child relationship at birth with applicants 
for adoption rather than with the birth mother, would that infringe on any constitutional 
right of the child? Or would the birth mother be the only person with standing to 
challenge the law? Such a law would be purely hypothetical in the U.S. (though 
not far from reality in some other parts of the world). But the actual current 
parentage laws in the United States, which confer legal parent status in almost all 
instances on biological parents, with no regard for fitness, also have a seriously adverse 
affect on a subset of children-specifically, children whose birth parents are manifestly 
unfit to raise children, as evidenced by serious child maltreatment histories, criminal 
records, substance abuse, mental illness, and/or imprisonment. This Article is the 
first to consider whether states violate a constitutional right of some children when their 
parentage laws consign the children to legal relationships with, and into the custody 
of, adults whom the state knows to be unfit. It identifies opportunities for children's 
advocates to advance constitutional challenges to state parentage laws as applied 
to newborn offspring of adults unfit to parent, and it presents a robust legal theory to 
underwrite such challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A significant percentage of children are born to birth parents who are 
unfit to raise children--evidenced by histories of serious child abuse, violent 
felonies, mental illness, and/or chronic substance abuse-and who are highly 
unlikely to become fit within a reasonable period after their offspring's birth.' 
1. Estimating the percentage or number of birth parents who fall under the description 
"manifestly unfit" is difficult. Because states do not seek to identify such birth parents, they do not 
amass such statistics, and no private organization or individual has done so either. However, several 
relevant figures suggest that the number is substantial. Roughly 40 percent of the 300 million U.S. 
population is of reproducing age. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, 
tbl. S0101. Age and Sex, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/S1Table?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST _GOO_S0101 {listing 42.2 percent of the population as being between the 
ages of 15 and 44). In 2007, an estimated 9.3 million people in the U.S. used illicit drugs other than 
marijuana. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., DEI"TOFHEALTII AND HUMAN 
SERV., REsULTS FROM TilE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL 
FINDINGS 17, http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k7nsduh/2k7Results.pdf. In 1999, researchers estimated 
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Congress has, in the past dozen years, pushed states to be more proactive in 
protecting these babies from maltreatment by conditioning certain federal 
grants on states making various changes to their child protection laws. In 
particular, Congress has pushed states to terminate parental rights immediately, 
without first undertaking extensive rehabilitation efforts, in the worst cases 
of birth parent unfitness, so that the babies can enter good adoptive homes.2 
However, state legislatures have not enacted all the statutory provisions 
necessary to accomplish this aim, and the state institutions charged with admin-
istering child protection laws-namely, child protection agencies and juvenile 
courts-are highly resistant to terminating parental rights before children 
incur serious maltreatment and/or prolonged foster care stays.3 In addition, 
following the Supreme Court's decision in Deshaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services,4 which rejected on state action grounds a 
constitutional tort suit against a negligent child protection agency, there 
is no constitutional lever to force child protection agencies to act more 
aggressively, pursuant to child maltreatment laws, to protect newborns at 
high risk of maltreatment. In short, the problem of protecting babies born to 
grossly unfit parents appears intractable. 
that several million children have parents who are drug addicts and twenty-eight million have 
alcoholic parents. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICfiON & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, CoLUMBIA UNIV., 
NO SAFE HAVEN: CHILDREN OF SUBSTANCE-ABUSING PARENTS, at ii (1999), http:// 
www.casacolumbia.org/absolutenm/articlefiles/3 79-No%20Safe%20Haven.pdf. Roughly 1 percent 
of all American adults are in prison. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN 
AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedfiles/8015PCTS_ 
Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf. A 2000 report estimated that over half of State and Federal 
prisoners are parents of minor children. See BUREAU OF jUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 0EP'T OF jUSTICE, 
INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 2 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf. 
It is estimated that roughly forty thousand women enter prison each year, 5 percent of whom, or 
two thousand women, are pregnant at the time of entry. See Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle 
Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/03/02/national/02shackles.html. Child protective services agencies identify almost a million 
maltreated children each year. See ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, U.S. 0EP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2006, at 25 (2008), available at http:// 
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/chapter3.htm#subjects. In 2006, roughly fifteen hundred 
children died of abuse or neglect. Id. at 65. Almost 14 percent of the fatalities were caused by parents 
who had been subject to child protection intervention in the prior five years. Id. at 67. 
2. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (2008) 
(codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 678, 679b (2000)). For presentation of the empirical literature on 
parental unfitness and the effects of maltreatment on infants, and for discussion of state and federal 
laws governing child protection and their shortcomings, see James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection 
Pretense: States' Continued Consignment of Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2008). 
3. For presentation of the studies documenting social worker and judicial resistance to termination 
of parental rights, see id. at 146--51, 159-{)1. 
4. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
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What legal advocates for children and legal scholars have overlooked, 
however, is the potential for attacking the problem further upstream, by 
advancing a constitutional challenge not to child protection laws or agency 
inaction, but to parentage statutes. Enactment and enforcement of state statutes 
conferring legal parent status on biological parents without regard to fitness, 
thereby forcing a substantial number of newborn babies to be in intimate asso-
ciations with people the state knows to be unfit to parent, clearly constitutes state 
action and is the root cause of great harm to these children. Newborn babies 
must have a constitutional right against state legislatures placing them into legal 
family relationships with adults whom the state knows (by virtue of state child 
abuse and criminal registries, reports of fetal drug exposure, and prison records) 
to be dangerous to them. 
In fact, much legal scholarship and judicial decisionmaking has been 
devoted to the constitutionality of parentage laws. But almost all of it has focused 
on the constitutional rights of adults: either adults who want to be legal parents but 
are denied the opportunity, or adults who do not want to be legal parents yet 
have that status thrust upon them.5 What little consideration there has been of 
children's constitutional rights in connection with parentage has been limited to 
older children who seek but are denied legal protection for an already established 
and healthy social parent-child relationship that they have with an adult who 
is not a legal parent.6 There has been no consideration of whether newborn 
children have any constitutional rights in connection with this legal action 
that largely determines the fundamental quality of their entire lives, including 
a right to avoid a legal parent-child relationship that is very bad for them, 
leaving them free to enter into a legal relationship with adults who would be 
good caregivers. This Article is the first to do so. 
5. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
429, 453-66 (2007); Karl E. Hong, Parens Patri[archy]: lldoprian, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL 
W. L. REV. 1, 63-76 (2003); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the 
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 753 (1999); Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining 
the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn lldoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363 (1996); PhilipS. 
Welt, lldoption and the Constitution: Are lldoptive Parents Really "Strangers Without Rights?," 1995 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165; Amy Wilkinson-Hagen, The lldoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision 
of Parens Patriae and Parents' Constitutional Rights, II GEO.J. ON PoVERTY L &PoL'Y 137 (2004). 
6. Several court decisions sparked such scholarly discussion. For example, in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion), Justice Scalia's plurality opinion tersely dismissed 
a claim on behalf of a child in a paternity case that she had a right to receive legal recognition for her 
relationship with her biological father, as against a state law creating an irrebuttable presumption 
that her mother's husband was the sole legal father. /d. at 130-31. In cases where biological fathers 
whose parental rights were not properly terminated petitioned to undo an adoption, state courts have 
entertained and rejected arguments that the child in question had a constitutional right to remain in 
a relationship with and in the custody of the adoptive parents. See Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 
324,338--39 (Ill. 1995); In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649,665 (Mich. 1993). 
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So imagine this case: Michele was just born. Her birth mother Jane has 
struggled with a serious mental illness for many years and has mostly lived on 
the street or in abandoned buildings. Four months ago a court terminated her 
parental rights as to two other children, because she had abused and neglected 
them and then failed to respond to rehabilitative services provided by the 
local child protection agency. She is no better prepared to parent today; in 
fact, the termination threw her into a state of deep despondency and suicidal 
ideations. Michele's biological father John went to prison six months ago to 
serve a three year sentence for sexually molesting Michele's older sister when 
the sister was four years old. He has been drug addicted for many years, and 
his rights with respect to that older sister were terminated. Jane's and John's 
extended family members live in the drug- and crime-infested neighborhood 
where Jane and John grew up, and many of them are addicts also. The local 
adoption and social services agencies have long lists of highly qualified couples 
wanting to adopt a newborn baby. 
The question this Article addresses is whether a state violates a constitu-
tional right of Michele by enacting and implementing a law that places her at 
the outset of her life into a legal parent-child relationship with Jane and John 
rather than with one of the couples who has qualified for adoption. That is, 
in fact, what would happen in any state today.7 State statutes would also confer 
on Jane and John, as Michele's legal parents, a presumptive right to physical 
custody of her, thus requiring birthing facility personnel to hand over the baby to 
Jane (rather than to an adoption agency) for her to take home, absent child 
protection agency intervention.8 Thus empowered by state statutes, Jane would 
almost certainly take Michele from the hospital to live with her, and Michele 
would then be at great risk for serious abuse and neglect.9 
Moreover, after forcing Michele to be in this dependent relationship with 
someone demonstrably unfit to parent, the state will do little or nothing to 
prevent or mitigate the expected damage to her. Most likely the local child 
protection agency would not even be aware of Michele's birth, and even if it 
were aware it would have no clear legal authority to do anything to protect 
Michele until after she incurs abuse and/or neglect.10 And so, as a result of the 
7. See infra Part I. The existence of a better alternative set of parents is important to my assess-
ment of the state's placement of a baby into a legal and custodial relationship with unfit parents. I assume 
throughout the article that demand for adoption of newborns would remain high. Were the demand 
to evaporate, the assessment would differ in significant respects. However, the basic idea that babies 
have a constitutional right that constrains state decisionmaking about their parentage and custody, 
requiring the state to act solely as agent for the children in making these decisions, would still apply. 
8. See infra Part I. 
9. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 442-47. 
10. See id. 
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state's statutes consigning her to a legal relationship with Jane and John and 
to the custody of Jane, Michele will likely experience material and affective 
deprivation, the trauma of abuse, and the travails of foster care, in tum depriving 
her of a secure attachment with a consistent, nurturing caregiver and causing her 
to suffer serious neurological, psychological, emotional, and social damage. 11 
This early damage from deficient parenting, coupled with growing up in an 
inhospitable and unstable environment, will severely undermine Michele's 
life prospects. Her childhood, adolescence, and adulthocxl will likely be marred 
by numerous dysfunctions, such as cognitive impairment, delayed language 
acquisition, poor school performance, chronic illness, emotional withdrawal, 
indiscriminate socializing, hyperactivity, lack of impulse control, failure to 
internalize moral norms, depression, anxiety, juvenile delinquency, running away 
from home, suicide, substance abuse, teen pregnancy, prostitution, adult 
criminality, unemployment, incurring or inflicting partner violence, and/or 
maltreatment of her own children.12 
Thus, current state parentage statutes dictating the family lives of babies 
born to manifestly unfit birth parents predictably and substantially endanger 
babies' wellbeing and severely undermine their chances for a happy and 
fulfilling life. States do this to babies even though they could avoid doing so 
without great difficulty and could in addition save taxpayers a lot of money by 
leaving such children free for family formation with different, fit parents at the 
outset. 13 Might it be unconstitutional for the state to do this to babies? 
As noted above, legal scholars have not asked this question. The Supreme 
Court has addressed numerous types of constitutional claims on behalf of adults 
in connection with parenthocxl-rights to have adult consensual sex/4 to con-
ceive or not to conceive children while having sex,15 to prevent a child once 
conceived from being bom/6 to become a legal parent to one's offspring,17 to 
11. On the effects of attachment failure and child maltreatment, see id. at 415-24. On the 
correlation between panicular parental characteristics and child maltreatment, see id. at 424-27. 
12. See id . at 423-24. 
13. See infra Parts lli.C and IV. 
14. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 566 (2003) (finding the right ro adult consensual sexual 
activity to be protected by the Founeenth Amendment). 
15. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried individuals to 
purchase contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right of married 
couples to purchase contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating on equal 
protection grounds a state law authorizing sterilization of cenain criminals) . 
16. See Gonzales v. Carhan, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . 
17. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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maintain a relationship with a foster child, 18 to control a child's life after becom~ 
ing a legal parent,19 and to remain a child's parent even after abusing or 
neglecting the child.20 Lower courts have addressed constitutional rights 
of adults in connection with adoption.21 Yet throughout the judicial system, 
federal and state statutory law, and legal scholarship, there is no discussion of 
whether children have a constitutional right against the state's placing them 
into parent~child relationships with adults who are unfit to parent. This is so 
even though it is now well established that children are persons under 
the Constitution and that they can and do possess substantive rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.22 It is so even though parentage 
decisions generally impact children far more than they impact the adults 
involved, because children's fundamental formation of personhood is at stake.23 
And it is so even though there is widespread recognition that some birth parents 
pose a very high risk to the basic well being of their offspring.24 Consideration of 
whether children have a constitutional right against the state forcing them to be 
in very bad parent~child relationships is long overdue. 
Part I of this Article describes prevailing parentage laws, which are indif~ 
ferent to parental fitness, and states' child protection laws and practices, which 
are predominantly reactive rather than proactive in addressing parental 
unfitness. Part II identifies and illustrates broader constitutional principles 
concerning persons' rights in connection with relationship formation and 
intimate association by examining existing statutory and doctrinal law governing 
state creation of legal relationships and control over intimate associations in 
other contexts. 
Part III then considers doctrinal and theoretical bases for attributing con~ 
stitutional rights to newborn children with respect to states' creation of legal 
parent~child relationships. It concludes that courts should recognize a 
substantive due process right of newborn babies against states placing them 
into legal relationships with and the custody of birth parents who have known 
18. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816,845 (1977). 
19. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) . 
20. See Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiterv. ~'tofSoc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
21. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting a challenge to a state's refusal to allow homosexuals adoption rights). 
22. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
23 . See McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 262 (Wash. 1987) ("'[l]t is the child who has the 
most at stake in a paternity proceeding."' (quoting State v. Santos, 702 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Wash. 1985))) . 
24. Such recognition motivated Congress to pass the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997, Pub. L. 105-89, Ill Stat. 2115 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 678, 679b (2000)), and the 
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800. See Dwyer, supra 
note 2, at 435-41. 
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histories or current conditions that indicate unfitness, absent demonstration 
by such birth parents that they presently are or soon can be fit to parent. 
Recognizing such a right would not require overturning any constitutional 
precedents. It also would not require courts or agencies to do anything with 
respect to individual children that is unprecedented as a practical matter, 
because today child protection agencies do on rare occasion assume custody 
of newborns and immediately place them for adoption despite binh parents' 
objection. It would, however, effect a paradigm shift in the way state actors and 
the public view family formation, and it would result in many more babies being 
spared from maltreatment. Significantly, Pan Ill shows that common beliefs 
as to the established constitutional rights of adults to raise their biological 
offspring are mistaken; existing Supreme Court doctrine actually suggests 
that unfit biological parents have no substantive constitutional right to be in a 
legal parent-child relationship with their offspring. 
Part IV explains how in practical terms a guardian ad litem or local child 
protection agency attorney could advance the constitutional claim this Article 
articulates and defends, and it identifies the amendments to state law that are 
needed for states to avoid violating this constitutional right of newborns. 
l. HOW THE STATE CREATES PARENT -CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 
To appreciate the appropriateness and imporrance of a child-focused con-
stitutional rights analysis of parentage law, one must understand the state's 
integral role in family formation, the indifference of current parentage laws 
to parental unfitness, and the dim legal prospects for undoing a bad parentage 
assignment before it seriously damages a child. 
A. The State's Role in Family Formation 
Newborns' entry into legal relationships with and physical custody of 
biological parents is so taken for granted that the state's role goes unnoticed. 
But it is only because state statutes make biological parents the legal parents 
of a newborn child and give legal parents presumptive custody rights that birth 
parents have legal permission to do what would otherwise be kidnapping-that 
is, to take a person to their home and confine the person there without that 
person's consent.25 This is something the law does not allow anyone else to do 
25. For examples of starutes granting custody w binh parents, see GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-5-45(a)(3) 
(2007) ("'Lawful custody' means that custody inherent in the narural parents, that custody awarded by proper 
authority as provided in Oxle Section 15-11-45, or that custody awarded to a parent, guardian, or other person 
by a court of competent jurisdiction."); OHlO REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.08 (LexisNexis 2007) ("The wife and 
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to a baby, even though there are many other people (for instance, those on 
adoption waiting lists) who would like to do so. If a doctor who delivered a baby 
attempted to keep the baby, rather than handing the baby over to the birth 
mother or father, the state could prosecute the doctor criminally, because the 
state has given legal rights to the birth parents and not to the doctor. 
One might think it natural, even divinely ordained, that biological parents 
become the custodians of a baby. However, if someone other than the biological 
parents tried to stop birth parents from taking a baby home from the hospital or 
tried to take the baby home themselves, it is not an invocation of human nature 
or religious texts that would enable birth parents to ensure that they and 
no one else assume custody of the baby. Rather, it would be statutes that 
a legislature has passed and imposed on the citizenry-namely, parentage 
laws, child custody laws, and kidnapping laws. Part Ill below considers whether 
the state should recognize and rest its decisionmaking on assumptions about 
natural law or on a right of biological parents to receive such statutory 
protection, but even if that were so, it would still be state action (legislative 
enactment and executive and judicial implementation of those laws) that 
directly creates the parent-child relationship as a legal and social entity, and that 
state action must be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
husband are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and ... have equal powers, rights, and 
duties .... "). For examples of statutes prohibiting persons without state-conferred legal parent status 
from taking possession of a child, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(A)-(A)(l) (2001) ("A 
person commits custodial interference if, knowing or having reason to know that the person has 
no legal right to do so, the person ... [t]akes, entices or keeps from lawful custody any child ... who 
is entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person .... "); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-3-302(2) (West 2008) ("Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own 
under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or 
guardian ... commits second degree kidnapping."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(b)(l)-(b)(l)(A) 
(2007) ("A person commits the offense of interference with custody when without lawful authority 
to do so the person ... [k)nowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child ... away from the individual 
who has lawful custody of such child .... "); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-4501-(4) (2004) ("Every person who 
willfully ... [l]eads, takes, entices away or detains a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, with intent to 
keep or conceal it from its custodial parent, guardian or other person having lawful care or control 
thereof, ... is guilty of kidnapping."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:45(A)-(A)(2) (2007) (Simple 
kidnapping is ... [t)he intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, for an unlawful purpose, of any child 
not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without the consent of its parent or the person 
charged with its custody."); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW§ 3-503(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) ("A 
person may not, without color of right: (i) forcibly abduct, take, or carry away a child under the age 
of 12 years from: 1. the home or usual place of abode of the child; or 2. the custody and control of the 
child's parent or legal guardian; ... or (iii) with the intent of depriving the child's parent or legal guardian, 
or any person lawfully possessing the child, of the custody, care, and control of the child, knowingly 
secrete or harbor a child under the age of 12 years. (2) In addition to the prohibitions provided under 
paragraph ( 1) of this subsection, a person may not, by force or fraud, kidnap, steal, take, or carry away 
a child under the age of 16 years."). 
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The state's essential involvement in formation of all parent-child 
relationships is a plain and important fact courts and scholars have generally 
overlooked. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed skepticism in 
addressing a claim by foster parents against the state severing their relationship 
with children in their care because of what it saw as a categorical distinction 
between foster care relationships and the "natural family." The Court stated 
that, whereas the foster parent-child relationship "has its source in state law," the 
relationship between the child and the parents to whom the state aimed to 
return them has "its origins entirely apart from the power of the [s]tate."26 
Similarly, in rejecting a challenge by gay persons to a Florida law precluding 
them from adopting children, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
"Unlike biological parentage, which precedes and transcends formal recognition 
by the state, adoption is wholly a creature of the state."27 The Eleventh Circuit 
also aimed to distinguish adoption by characterizing it as a "public act," asserting 
that "would-be adoptive parents are asking the state to confer official 
recognition-and, consequently, ... insulation from subsequent state 
• _£ 1 . h. ,zs mterrerence ... on a re attons tp .... 
In each instance, the distinction the courts drew was either the wrong 
distinction or an illusory distinction. If the distinction is truly between 
biological parentage and legal adoption, it is the wrong distinction to make. 
Biological parentage, which is indeed a private act occurring independently 
of any state action, in and of itself has no effect on a child's family situation 
after birth. Biological parentage has a connection to children's family lives 
today only because the state (in the form of legislatures and/or courts) makes 
it determinative of legal parenthood and state-protected custody. The state 
clearly could do otherwise, as is evident from the history of the law's treatment of 
unwed biological fathers, which for most of American history was to treat 
them as simply nonparents.29 Were the state today to cease giving legal effect 
26. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816,845 (1977). 
27. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004); see 
also id. at 817 ("Here ... [t]he relevant state action is ... grant of a statutory privilege [a]nd the asserted 
liberty interest is ... the affirmative right to receive official and public recognition."); In re Baby Girl 
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665 (Mich. 1993) (quoting OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977), in 
support of distinction between biological parents and would-be adoptive parents); Lindley for Lindley 
v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Because of its statutory basis, adoption differs from 
natural procreation in a most important and striking way."). 
28. Lofwn, 358 F.3d at 810. 
29. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal/mages of Fatherhood: Welfare Refarm, Chikl Support Enforcement, and 
Fmherless Chiklren, 81 NCJIRE DAME L REv. 325,331 (2005) ('The common law principle that fatherhood 
would only be recognized within marriage remained the law until the late twentieth century when the law 
began to recognize unmarried fathers .... "); id. at 332 ("If a child was born to an unmarried woman, the 
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and protection to any biological parents' desire to raise their offspring, that 
desire could be frustrated at any time by any state or private actors who wished 
to take possession of a child. 
The legally relevant distinction would instead be that between legal 
parentage predicated upon biology on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
legal parentage predicated upon a desire to parent and/or past caretaking. But · 
then the distinction the courts attempt to draw is illusory, for it is nonsensical to 
say that legal parentage predicated upon anything precedes and transcends 
the state. It is the state that creates laws and therefore creates legal parentage 
in every instance. Legal parentage necessarily has its origins in the power 
of the state regardless of what motivates state actors to create it or what 
fact-procreation or qualification or caregiving-state actors choose to make 
determinative. Legal parentage predicated on biology is somewhat less visible, 
because in a majority of cases it happens by virtue of a statute and routine 
agency action (issuance of a birth certificate) rather than by individualized court 
determinations. But the state is creating the legal parent-child relationship 
whether it is doing so by statutes that cover a large number of children or by 
judicial decisions involving one child at a time. And in a substantial minority 
of cases legal parentage based on biology does arise by individualized court 
action-namely, paternity suits . Moreover, birth parents' filing of a birth 
certificate and/or an acknowledgement of paternity with a state agency is just 
as much a public act seeking official recognition as is filing an adoption 
petition.30 That the state action involved in biologically-based legal parentage is 
generally unobserved and taken for granted does not make such parentage 
private. Creation of legal parent-child relationships is always state action, 
and the state can and should be held accountable in every case for 
predictable consequences of that action. 
child had no father."); id. at 333-37. I address whether doing otherwise would be consistent with 
current doctrine regarding the constitutional rights of biological parents in Part III below. 
30. The Lofton court supported characterization of adoption as a public act by maintaining 
that "these prospective adoptive parents are electing to open their homes and their private lives 
to close scrutiny by the state," and that "a person who seeks to adopt is asking the state to conduct an 
examination into his or her background." Lofton, 358 F.3d at 810-11. This is fanciful and question-
begging. Only under a peculiar definition of "electing" and "asking" do adoption applicants elect and 
ask for state inspection. They accept it because the state makes it a condition of applying. If the state 
required inspection of biological parents, we would not say that by filing a birth certificate biological 
parents "ask" to be inspected. In fact, all parents, biological and adoptive, are to some degree under 
state scrutiny; child maltreatment laws apply to all parents, all are susceptible to being reported to a 
scare agency at any time for maltreatment, and the state investigates all colorable claims of child 
maltreatment whether parents are biological or adoptive. That there is a kind of state scrutiny before 
investiture oflegal parenthood in the case of adoption and not in the case of biologically-based 
parentage reflects simply the state's choices, not any real public/private distinction. 
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This does not make children creatures of or owned by the state . A 
newborn baby is no one's creature or property. It is simply the case that 
people enter the world unowned yet incapable of caring for themselves or 
choosing caretakers for themselves, so there must be binding and enforceable 
rules as to who will assume custody and care of babies. The state is the only 
plausible candidate for establishing and enforcing such rules. The state acts 
vis a vis every newborn baby in a "protective and provisional role,''31 pursuant 
to its long-recognized parens patriae authority,32 just as it does vis a vis adults 
who become incompetent, in establishing and enforcing rules for creating 
guardian-ward relationships. Incompetent adults do not become creatures of 
the state by virtue of guardianship laws, even though the state steps in to 
make a vital and analogous decision about their private lives. 
B. The Content of Parentage Laws 
What, then, do existing state parentage laws say? With respect to birth 
mothers, the rules are fairly uniform and simple; the state makes the woman 
who gives birth to a child the legal parent of that child.33 Nothing more than 
giving birth is a necessary condition for the state making one a legal parent. 
In recent decades, some states have carved out two exceptions to the 
rule that the birth mother is always a child's first legal mother. First, a few states 
recognize surrogacy arrangements, in which the birth mother is neither a genetic 
mother nor an intending mother-that is, a woman who wishes and intends 
to raise the child, and they invest initial legal motherhood instead in the woman 
who contracts with the surrogate.34 Second, most states now have "safe haven" 
31. The Lof[l]TI court characterized in this way the state's role in creating parent-child 
relationships through adoption law. Id. at 809. The Supreme Court has observed that "juveniles, 
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody," Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984), and 
that "where the custody of the parent or legal guardian fails, the government may (indeed, we have 
said must) either exercise custody itself or appoint someone else to do so." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 
292, 302 (1993 ); see also Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 ("(I)f parental control falters, the State must play its 
part as parens patriae"). One might say, then, that conceptually children enter the world in 
government custody and the state subsequently, via parentage and custody laws, assigns them to the 
custody of private parties. 
32. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) ("States are vested with the 
historic parens patriae power, including the duty to protect 'persons under legal disabilities to act for 
themselves."' (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972))) . 
33. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decisionmaking About 
Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILLRTS. J. 845, 859--6) (2003). 
34. See Brian Bix , Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1753, 1769 (2007) . Now with 
the possibility of egg donation, a woman might become the legal mother of a child she bears even if 
she is not the genetic mother. See generally Kira Horstmeyer, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else's 
Basket: Inserting Uniformity Inro the Uniform Parentage Ads Treatment of Assisted Reproduction, 64 
WASH. & LEEL REV. 671,687-88 (2007) . 
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laws, authorizing birth parents to leave a newborn baby at a designated facility 
and walk away from parenthood, and these laws could operate in some cases 
to enable a birth mother to prevent legal parent status from ever investing in 
her.35 So there has been some movement away from the idea that the birth 
mother must always be the first legal mother, and also away from the idea that a 
genetic connection is all important, though principally in the rare case in which 
the birth mother and the genetic mother are not the same person or in 
which a birth mother whose legal maternity is not yet established wishes to 
abandon her baby. 
Crucially, no state takes into account in its parenthood-conferring 
statutes that a birth mother might be grossly unfit to parent a child, as might 
be evidenced by her having had parental rights as to other children 
terminated recently and/or by her having a severe drug addiction or mental 
illness. At best, as discussed below, the state will attempt to divest an unfit 
birth mother of legal parenthood after conferring it and only after the child 
has suffered harm, through a lengthy termination of parental rights (TPR) 
process. 
With respect to fathers, the rules are more complicated, though 
biological paternity is ultimately controlling in nearly all cases for fathers just 
as for mothers. Across the U.S., there is effectively a presumption that a birth 
mother's husband is the biological father, 36 but in nearly all states another 
man who believes he is the biological father can petition to rebut the 
presumption and claim legal fatherhood, using genetic tests. 37 In a substantial 
minority of states-those that have adopted the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act 
(UP A)-additional circumstances give rise to a presumption of paternity, 
such as holding out a child as one's own (telling people a child is one's 
offspring), living with the mother and child, or signing an acknowledgment of 
paternity form.38 But in nearly all these states as well, any such presumption 
35. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, lHfant Safe Haven Laws (2007), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/safehaven.cfm. Typically, a birthing 
facility enters a birth mother's name on an application for a birth certificate and sends it to the state 
vital records office; thus, if the birth mother left the baby at a safe haven, she would become the 
initial legal parent but then be divested of legal parenthood. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 481. But a 
woman might give birth at home and bring the baby to a safe haven, and in that case never be 
officially recognized as a legal parent. 
36. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 868--69, 879--80. The marital presumption might be explicit 
in paternity rules or implicit in statutory rules for filing birth certificates, which in some states say a 
birth mother's husband presumptively should be listed as the father. !d. 
37. See id. at 869-70. 
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-5(a)(4) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2007); CoLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 19-4-105 (l)(d) (2008); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (Supp. 2006); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.204 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
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can be rebutted with genetic tests showing it was actually another man 
who procreated with the mother.39 
Even more so than in the case of maternity, though, paternity law and 
practice reflect some disentangling of biological and legal parenthood. The 
marital and holding out presumptions of paternity are today seen more as 
indicative of the existence of a family unit or of psychological parenthood 
that warrants protection on welfare grounds, rather than as indicative of 
biological parenthood.4° Courts in a few states have held that a man 
believing himself to be the biological father may not challenge a presumption 
if a court believes rebutting the presumption would be contrary to the child's 
interests, with the focus typically on a child's interest in continuity of 
relationships with other adults.41 In a few cases, courts in UPA states have 
considered a child's interests along with other policy considerations in 
choosing between two paternity petitioners, each of whom has a statutory 
presumption in his favor, even when they know which man is the biological 
father. 42 In addition, most states today exclude from legal parenthood men 
who donate sperm for artificial insemination of a woman who is not their wife, 
instead conferring legal fatherhood on the woman's husband, if he consented 
to the procedure.43 As with maternity laws, however, paternity laws generally 
ignore whether a man is fit to parent. 
Adoption laws also create parent-child relationships, generally after the 
state terminates a legal parent's child-rearing rights. These sometimes operate 
soon after a child's birth, though almost exclusively when the child's 
biological parents choose to give up the rights that parentage laws confer on 
them, either formally (by executing a relinquishment document) or informally 
39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-5(b) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§ 19-4-105(2)(a) (2008); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-631 (Supp. 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 160.631(b) (Vernon 2002). But see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-57 (2004) (restricting 
standing to challenge marital presumption to husband, wife, and child); Lisa I. v. Superior 
Coun, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 927 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that state statute does not confer standing on 
putative fathers to challenge marital presumption, even if mother later becomes unmarried). 
40. See Michael H. v. Gerald 0., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Murphy, supra 
note 29, at337. 
41. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 262 (Wash. 1987); see also Theresa 
Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W.VA. 
L. REv. 547, 574-75 (2000). 
42. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 874-75; Glennon, supra note 41, at 576. 
43. See Horstmeyer, supra note 34, at 684-92; see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3-3(a) 
(West 1999). But cf. In re K.M.H., 169 PJd 1025, 1037 (Kan. 2007) (discussing state coun decisions 
finding sperm donors to have a substantive due process right to legal parenthood if they agreed as 
such in writing with mother). 
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{by abandonment).44 Sometimes birth mothers select adoptive parents, 
and other times the local child protective services (CPS) agency qualifies and 
chooses adoptive parents.45 In either case, the state's statutory rules for 
conferring legal parenthood by adoption reflect a vastly different mindset 
relative to maternity and paternity laws. Adoption law attributes no 
entitlement to prospective parents, even though they generally have a very 
strong desire to parent, but rather requires applicants to qualify for parenthood 
by showing not merely that they are not grossly unfit, but that their becoming 
legal parents would be in the child's best interests.46 The state conducts 
background checks on the would-be adoptive parents, makes them fill out a 
lengthy application, and supervises them with the baby in their home for six 
months or more.47 It is inconceivable that an adoption agency or court would 
permit Jane and John, from the case described above in the Introduction, to 
adopt a child. Any agency that placed in their custody a child who was not 
their biological offspring would undoubtedly be subject to vehement public 
protest, legislative condemnation, and punitive damages in a lawsuit on 
behalf of the child. 
Absent relinquishment or abandonment, however, the state, with rare 
exception, confers on biological parents legal parenthood and a statutory 
right to physical custody of newborn babies, with no prior assessment of their 
fitness, and thereby empowers them to take the babies to their homes under 
their exclusive control and without supervision, unless and until someone 
reports them for committing serious maltreatment.48 As discussed in the next 
subsection, the state does occasionally take protective custody of newborns, 
but only in a very small percentage of all cases in which birth parents pose a 
danger to a baby, and then it typically consigns the baby to a lengthy period 
of multiple foster care placements.49 
C. Prospects for Undoing a Bad Parentage Decision 
There is today the theoretical possibility of the state terminating the legal 
parenthood of some unfit biological parents immediately after birth, before 
44. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-2005{1), (4) (Supp. 2008) (authorizing the termina-
tion of parental rights (TPR) based on abandonment and on execution of relinquishment form set 
forth in statute). 
45. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 888-89. 
46. See id. at 882-83, 886-88. 
4 7. See id. at 885-86. 
48. See id. at 940-41,944-46. 
49. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 410, 413,428 n.86. 
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those parents have had a chance to harm the child, even when the biological 
parents assert their rights. However, this almost never happens. 
The law creates the theoretical possibility in two ways. First, spurred by 
the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)/0 states today 
can authorize involuntary TPR at any time in a child's life, without attempts 
to reform the parents, based on a parent's past conduct toward other 
children-specifically, maltreatment sufficiently serious to result in TPR 
and/or criminal felony charges as to a prior child. 51 So in Michele's case, because 
the state had terminated Jane and John's rights as to an older sibling, a court 
could terminate their rights as to Michele immediately after Michele's birth, 
making her available for adoption. If a court did so, if the child protection 
agency immediately placed Michele with a couple seeking adoption, and if 
courts expeditiously finalized the TPR and adoption, the practical conse-
quences would not be much different from denying legal parentage to Jane 
and John in the first instance. 
Second, some states ostensibly authorize adoption of a child over the 
objection of a biological father, even though this terminates his parental 
rights or forestalls his paternity, without having to go through the usual state-
initiated process for TPR. These circumstances include: the biological father's 
failure to put his name on a putative father registry, 52 the biological 
father's failure to support the mother during pregnancy,53 the adoption court find-
ing that the biological father is unfit, 54 the child's having been conceived by 
the biological father's raping of the mother,55 and even a finding that the 
biological father is simply withholding consent contrary to the best interests 
of the child.56 This last type of provision has been subject to constitutional 
challenges several times, but courts have generally rejected the biological 
fathers' claims.57 
50. Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 678, 679b (2000) ). 
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(15)(0) (2000). 
52. See Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers ar Pop-Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative 
Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newbarn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 170-75 (2006). 
53. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN § 59-2136(h)(1)(0), (E) (Supp. 2007); In reAdoption of 
Baby E.A.W, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995). 
54. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-2136(h)(l)(B) (Supp. 2007). 
55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.23.180(c)(3) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-2005(2)(a) 
(Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-8(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-
2136(h)(l)(F) (Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 1-22-110(a)(viii) (2007). 
56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.23.180(c)(2) (2006). 
57. See Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adoption of His Child by Withholding Consent, 
61 A.L.R.Sth 151, § 9 (2008). The only exception noted is Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.Zd 674 
(Tenn. 1994). 
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A couple of states even authorize an adoption that terminates the birth 
mother's parental rights over her objection. In Indiana, this is the case if a 
court finds either that her reasons for refusing consent are not in the best 
interests of the child or that she is unfit and the adoption would be in the child's 
best interests. 58 In Missouri, courts can approve an adoption over the objection 
of any birth "parent who has a mental condition which is shown by competent 
evidence either to be permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the condition can be reversed and which renders the parent unable to 
knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control."59 
These rules relating to TPR and adoption create the potential for a 
somewhat less blunt state assignment of newborns to parents, and they 
constitute further evidence that there is no ironclad cultural assumption that 
biological parents must always have the opportunity to raise the children they 
produce. However, these rules create only narrow exceptions to the default rule 
of assigning children to biological parents, and in practice they have very 
little effect. 
The new TPR grounds based on child maltreatment history omit a substan-
tial range of cases in which biological parents are not fit to raise a child-in 
particular, cases in which a parent has had other children in foster care for 
a long period and the prognosis for rehabilitation is very poor, cases in which 
parents have a severe drug addiction or mental illness at the time their first 
child is born, and cases in which a parent is in prison or a juvenile detention 
facility. In addition, states have generally not backed up these new TPR 
rules with any mechanism for identifying at the time of birth those biological 
parents who have serious maltreatment histories, nor with any legal 
authorization for agencies to intervene at the time of birth on the basis 
of such history .60 Thus, in practice, they are only used after biological 
parents have already taken a baby home for some time and abused or 
neglected the baby, in which case the child's development has likely already been 
seriously compromised. 
The rules authorizing adoption without consent of the biological father 
exist in only a minority of states,61 generally apply only when the birth 
mother wants the child to be adopted, and, if reported court decisions are 
58. IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-19-9-S(a)(l0)-(11) (LexisNexis 2007). 
59. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 453.040(6) (West 2003). 
60. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 447-52. 
61. Cf. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) (holding that a biological father could prevent 
adoption, despite his "poor performance record as a parent," because state statutes required TPR under 
child protection statutory provisions prior to the adoption petition in order to obviate his consent). 
HeinOnline -- 56 UCLA L. Rev. 772 2008-2009
772 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 755 (2009) 
indicative, are rarely employed.62 There are no reported decisions applying 
Missouri's "mental condition" provision63 or Indiana's provision for overriding 
a mother's objection when her reasons are not in the child's best interests.64 
Some private party would need to initiate an adoption proceeding, and most 
likely very few people are aware of these laws authorizing adoption over 
maternal objection without CPS involvement. 
The overall picture, then, is that the state routinely places many 
newborn babies into legal and intimate social relationships with adults who 
are manifestly unfit to parent and who typically live in environments 
inhospitable to children. This state action predictably causes many children 
to incur developmental damage that seriously undermines their potential to 
live flourishing lives. Though the state cannot know in every instance which 
biological parents are very likely to abuse or neglect a baby, the state does now 
maintain records of people who have committed extreme child maltreatment 
in the past, people who have committed violent or drug-related felonies, 
people who have been committed to psychiatric facilities, and people who are 
in prison. And all births are reported to a state agency. The state currently 
does not put these two sets of information-parental history and children's 
births-together in order to identify high-risk birth parents. But it could do 
so with little difficulty, and this cross-checking of records could enable the 
state to stop placing babies in harmful relationships. 
One type of high-risk situation that does regularly come to CPS's 
attention is maternal drug addiction. As a result of the federal Keeping 
Children and Families Safe Act of 2003,65 hospitals now must report to the 
local child protective agency detection of drug exposure in newborns. 66 Drug 
addiction accounts for a very large percentage of child maltreatment cases,67 
so this reporting creates the potential for preventive action at the time of 
birth for many at-risk newborns. However, no state requires birthing facilities 
to perform toxicology screening of newborns, few require reporting of fetal 
alcohol exposure, and only a few authorize immediate TPR on the basis of a 
62. See 61 A.L.R.5th 151, at § 9 (listing only a d02en reported decisions since 1978 in the 
entire U.S. invoking best interests basis for obviating unwed father's consent to adoption). 
63. MO. ANN. STAT.§ 453.040(6). 
64. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-8(a)(10)-(11). 
65. Pub. L. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800. 
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2005). 
6 7. See Amy 0' Andrade & Jill Duerr Berrick, When Policy Meets Practice: The Untested Effects 
of Pennanency Reforms in ChilLi Welfare, 33 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 31, 37 (March 2006) 
("[E]stimates of the proportion of children placed in foster care at least in part due to substance abuse 
issues of the parents range from 50%-80%."). 
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parent's substance abuse, no matter how severe and chronic.68 If CPS takes any 
protective action in such cases, it is almost always to place the babies in tempo-
rary but long-term foster care, which is itself likely to impair their development.69 
D. Summary 
It is an indisputable fact that the state now forces a lot of newborn 
babies to be in intimate relationships that pose a grave danger to them, 
relationships that are much worse for them than would be alternative 
relationships available to those babies at the time of their birth. The state 
does this even though it knows or has ample reason to know of that danger. 
Long overdue is an examination of whether it is constitutionally permissible 
for the state to do this. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FORST ATE CONTROL OVER 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The state action of placing children into legal family relationships fits 
within a broad conceptual category that might be characterized as state 
action affecting intimate association, and with the conceptual subcategories 
of a) state action creating legal family relationships and b) state action 
controlling private association. It is a form of state action controlling private 
association because legal parent status, unlike some other legal relationships 
between private parties, such as that between spouses, entails a custodial 
right. This Part identifies a set of general principles that courts and legislatures 
have established in these two subcategories of cases. These principles will 
inform the analysis in Part Ill of children's substantive due process rights in 
family formation. 
A. State Creation of Legal Family Relationships 
The state creates many kinds of legal family relationships. In addition to 
the parent-child relationship, the state creates guardianships, legal marriages, 
and legal relationships between siblings, between grandparents and 
grandchildren, between aunts/uncles and nieces/nephews, among cousins, 
among in-laws, and among other extended family members. Statutes and 
constitutional doctrine relating to all these relationships suggest some general 
68. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 444-45,447-51. 
69. See id. at 426--28; Dwyer, supra note 33, at 952-66. 
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principles as to when the state may create a legal relationship without the 
consent of both parties and when it may refuse to create a legal relationship 
requested by one or more private parties. 
1. Legal Relationships Without Mutual Consent 
With the exception of spousal relationships, all the relationships just iden-
tified typically arise without the consent of both parties. Guardian-ward 
relationships similarly arise without the wards themselves giving present actual 
consent, precisely because the ward has been deemed incompetent. The other 
relationships arise without the consent of either party, even when all are compe-
tent adults; they arise incidentally from other people becoming parents and 
spouses and thereby creating legal family lines. Thus, while one might think 
chosen personal associations paradigmatic of legal family relationships, in fact 
most are unchosen for at least one member of the relationship, created by the 
state even in the absence of mutual express consent. 
On the surface, this might seem incompatible with notions of limited state 
authority over private life and respect for personhood, notions clearly reflected 
in legal rules governing marriage. There is no constitutional doctrine in the U.S. 
on state involvement in nonconsensual marriage, precisely because the idea is 
anathema in western society, so the state never attempts to involve itself in such 
a thing. 70 Instead, one sees U.S. courts deciding whether the danger of state-
sanctioned forced marriage in a non-western country for an alien present here 
is great enough that the alien should receive asylum, because forced 
marriage is widely recognized as a human rights violation.71 And one hears 
criticism of the government in states where polygamy is covertly practiced for 
not doing more to prevent it, mainly because of concerns about coerced 
marriages, and especially about children being forced into harmful relationships.72 
State laws excluding minors under a certain age from legal marriage are based on 
an assumption that autonomous consent is not possible for them and that state 
70. A small minority of U.S. states do confer marital status on some couples who have not 
manifested consent through a wedding ceremony, through rules of what is commonly called common 
law marriage. Those rules, however, require that both parties have manifested a consent to marry in 
other ways. See, e.g., Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.Zd 791, 794-95 (Utah 1994). 
71. See United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1962, art. 1(1), 521 U.N.T.S. 231, 234 (entered into force 
Dec. 9, 1964); Cara Goeller, Forced Marriage and the Granting of Asylum: A Reason to Hope After Gao 
v. Gonzales, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173 (2007) (discussing a Second Circuit decision 
overturning denial of asylum to women who had been sold inro marriage in China). 
72. See Richard A. Vasquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or 
Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Ught of Modem Constitutional]uris{mulence, 5 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'Y 225, 230 (2002). 
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creation of the relationship could be harmful to them, because of the rights, 
liabilities, and expectations that accompany state conferral of the legal 
status. The Supreme Court has pronounced broadly in dicta that "the 
Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control 
the selection of one's spouse."73 Yet many other kinds of legal family rela-
tionships arise without explicit free, reciprocal choice. How can we explain this? 
With respect to most of the relationships that arise without mutual 
express consent-namely, those other than guardianship and the parent-child 
relationship--the likely explanation is that their only effect is to confer 
benefits on the parties, which they are free to decline; the legal relationships 
do not prejudice the private parties in any way. Their primary relevance is 
for inheritance when decedents have not executed a will; intestacy rules give 
legal relatives waivable claims to wealth and aim to effectuate what the decedent 
most likely wanted.74 Some unchosen legal relationships also ensure priority 
consideration in fiduciary appointments or in end-of-life decisionmaking 
for incompetent persons/5 and some-particularly the grandparent 
relationship-give rise to standing to petition for custody of or visitation with a 
child.76 From the perspective of incompetent adults or of children whose 
nonparent relatives might petition for a court-ordered role in their lives, 
there is no prejudice from creating these extended family legal relationships, 
because state laws uniformly require courts to find that granting such a petition 
would be in the incompetent adult's or the child's best interests.77 
The guardian-ward and parent-child relationships, though, can prejudice or 
adversely affect the welfare of participants, because they entail substantial 
rights and responsibilities. These two types of relationships are in fact similar in 
many ways, and contrasting the laws governing them is illuminating. 
As to both, actual consent to formation of the relationship by both 
parties is not possible because one party is incapable of giving it. Both rela-
tionships preclude one of the parties from having a legal relationship of the 
same sort with other persons. Like a parent, the guardian of an incompetent 
7 3. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 ( 1984). 
74. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-104 (2007). 
75. See discussion of guardianship infra text accompanying notes 80--81. 
76. See ·Westlaw 50 State Statutory Surveys: Child Custody (2008) (discussing grandparent 
visitation); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (citing visitation statutes in 50 states); 
Dwyer, supra note 33, at 966--69 (discussing laws protecting siblings' interest in remaining together 
after parents' divorce or after state removal from parental custody). 
77. See discussion of guardianship infra, and Dwyer, supra note 33, at 972~4. If a custodial 
parent objects to visitation with a child, a coun might funher require a showing that denying visitation 
would harm the child. Id. at 979~0, 982. Thus, visitation with a non-parent is never forced on a 
child contrary to the child's welfare, but in some cases a child might be deprived of visitation even though 
the child would be better off if the visitation occurred. 
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adult is charged with primary responsibility for the welfare of the ward and 
receives substantial powers to direct the life of the ward. A guardian is less 
likely than a parent to live with the person under care, but many guardians do 
so. Depending on how much direct care a guardian provides, the guardian 
role can be more or less burdensome than parenthood typically is. The 
guardian role might usually be less satisfying than parenthood, because a 
ward's life trajectory is typically one of continual decline rather than growth 
and increasing independence, yet it is not uncommon for some family 
members of an incompetent adult to have a very strong desire to serve as 
guardian. Thus, the roles of guardian and parent usually entail significantly 
different experiences, but they are structurally similar, entail similar rights 
and responsibilities, and are both sought after enough to give rise to conflicts 
that end up in courts. One might therefore expect the laws governing 
formation of the two types of relationships to be fairly similar. 
With respect to the caregiver, the rules governing formation of the two 
relationships are effectively the same, despite a surface disparity. In the case 
of guardianship, there is always consent on the part of the caretaker; the law 
does not force anyone into the role of legal custodian and caregiver for an 
incompetent adult.78 In contrast, the law does sometimes impose legal 
parenthood on unwilling persons. However, birth parents can exit the 
parent-child relationship immediately after birth if both agree to place 
the child for adoption, and even when exit is not possible, a legal parent 
need take on no parenting burden other than financial support. The state 
does not force legal parents to take custody of or even visit their children, nor 
to participate in decisionmaking about a child.79 If the state does anything in 
response to a legal parent's choice to have nothing to do with a child other 
than paying child support, it would be to terminate the legal parent-child 
relationship in order to free the child legally for adoption by others. Thus, 
imposing a legal parent-child relationship on a nonconsenting birth parent does 
not greatly prejudice the parent, and the one burden it does entail-financial 
obligation-is arguably justifiable in quasi-tort terms as payment for 
consequences of voluntary behavior. In fact, one might view an adult's choice 
to engage in heterosexual sex as entailing implicit consent to a legal 
parent-child relationship and attendant support duty should that conduct 
happen to produce a child. 
78. See, e.g. , Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.050(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 2008) ("(T]he court shall 
consider the suitability of appointing any of the following persons who appear to be willing to 
serve." (emphasis added)). 
79. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 937. 
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With respect to the incompetent person in the relationship, on the other 
hand, there is a striking, substantive disparity between the law governing 
creation of guardian-ward relationships and the law governing creation of 
parent-child relationships. In appointing a guardian for an incompetent 
adult, the state respects that individual's personhood by insisting that the 
relationship arise exclusively on the basis of a finding that the ward chose it 
before becoming incompetent, in an advance directive of some kind, or that 
the ward would now choose it if able.80 In other words, the law makes the state 
decisionmaker a surrogate for the incompetent adult, directing the appointing 
court effectively to give proxy consent to a legal relationship on behalf of the 
nonautonomous person. 
When an incompetent adult has not given an advance directive as to 
who should be the guardian, or has named someone who now declines 
appointment or appears unsuitable, that proxy consent amounts to a "best 
interests" determination-that is, an assessment of which competent adult, 
among those willing to serve, would be the best caregiver for the incompetent 
adult. Typically statutes list categories of interested parties who have 
presumptive priority in appointment, but the list reflects assumptions as to 
whom wards generally would prefer to have care for them, and the 
presumption is rebuttable by showing that some other choice would better 
serve the ward's interests.81 Importantly, satisfying an applicant's desire for 
the position, no matter how intense, is not a permissible aim in selecting a 
80. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-3-4 (LexisNexis 2000) (authorizing persons to 
designate in advance a guardian for themselves should they be found in need of one); Mo. ANN. 
STAT.§ 475.050 (West Supp. 2008) ("Before appointing any other eligible person as guardian of an 
incapacitated person, or conservator of a disabled person, the court shall consider the suitability 
of appointing any ... eligible person nominated in a durable power of attorney executed by the 
incapacitated or disabled person ... before the inception of the person's incapacity ... . "); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.4 (2004) (authorizing persons to designate in advance a guardian for 
themselves should they be found in need of one); In re Estate of Salley, 742 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 
Dist. 0 . App. 1997) ("Where a ward's preference as to the appointment of a guardian is capable of being 
known, that intent is the polestar to guide probate judges in the appointment of their guardians. A 
ward's nominee, of course, may be rejected when unfit or unsuitable .... "); In re Estate of Doyle, 838 
N.E.2d 355, 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) ("In determining who shall be a disable person's guardian, the 
disabled person's personal preferences as to who should be his or her guardian is outweighed by what 
is in the disabled person's best interest."); In re Guardianship of Macak, 871 A.2d 767 , 772 (N.J. 
Super. A.D. 2005) (stating that in appointing a guardian, "the court should consider . .. the wishes of 
the incapacitated person if expressed" and that "(i)f there is a significant issue as ro the appropriate 
choice of guardian, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to advise the court as to the person's 
best interests."). 
81. See, e.g., ln re Guardianship ofQuindt, 396 So. Zd 1217 (Fla. App. 1981) (upholding 
the appointment of a neighbor rather than the daughter because it was in the ward's best interest). 
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guardian.82 Moreover, a judge aware of something rendering particular appli-
cants unfit to serve as guardian would not appoint them. A judge would not 
put the ward into a legal relationship with them, regardless of any statutory 
presumption in their favor. For example, a number of states categorically pre-
clude convicted felons from becoming guardians.83 And a court would 
certainly refuse to appoint an applicant who had previously served in a 
guardian role for an incompetent adult and had been removed from that role 
because he or she abused the ward. 
In contrast, parentage laws are not understood as effecting a proxy 
consent for children. Rather, they are viewed principally as satisfying a proprie-
tary interest of parents. Certainly one could characterize existing parentage laws 
as effectuating in most cases what newborn children would choose if able, 
in terms of who their legal parents will be, just as statutory priorities for 
appointing a guardian effectuate in most cases what an incompetent adult would 
choose if able. It is pretty universally believed that, all else being equal, children 
are better off being raised by their biological parents. But unlike 
guardianship laws, maternity and paternity laws do not contain an 
overarching best interests standard that controls when statutory priorities 
are inconsistent with it. As explained in Part I, children generally cannot 
avoid the state assigning them to legal family relationships with birth 
parents who want to be their legal parents, even if the birth parents are 
manifestly and grossly unfit. Moreover, once the state has created a legal 
relationship between a newborn baby and birth parents, it is quite difficult for 
the child to exit the relationship, no matter how horrible the birth parents 
are, unless the birth parents themselves wish to sever the relationship. 
Thus, in the case of a relationship between adults that is structurally similar 
to the parent-child relationship, with one person of greater capacity in a 
caregiving role vis a vis the other, the law aims to mirror the paradigmatic case 
of a mutually consemual relationship between two private parties, simply substi-
tuting proxy consent for actual consent in the case of a person unable to give 
actual consent. But in creating parent-child relationships, the state does not 
go very far in aiming to do so, insofar as it considers only biological relation 
and gives no consideration to birth parents' suitability for the parental role. 
Yet a baby is at much greater risk of harm in a parent-child relationship than 
82. See, e.g., Matter of Crist, 732 S.W.2d 587,590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("Preference is given 
a particular petitioner, not because the petitioner wants the position, but because the ward would 
want the petitioner appointed."); Estate of Salley, 742 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
(faulting the trial court for aiming to placate family members in selecting guardian). 
83. See jOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY: LAW, EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY 145 (2007). 
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a ward typically is in a guardian-ward relationship. Parents who choose to 
take custody of a child have plenary power, not limited by a best-interest 
standard, over children's social experience, cognitive formation, and material 
wellbeing. Custodial parents are generally left undisturbed unless and 
until someone reports them to CPS for threatening the safety or basic physical 
health of a child. At the same time, parents are practically free to give a 
child very little of their attention, even though infants require a great deal of 
nurturing attention for their healthy development.84 The state thus puts children 
in an extremely vulnerable position when it places them in legal parent-child 
relationships and confers custodial rights, yet when the placement is with 
biological parents the state does so with no regard for the parents' fitness to 
act as caregivers. 
Courts have not addressed constitutional challenges to guardianship laws. 
Undoubtedly this is because the substituted-judgment/best interests approach 
prevails, so that any objection to an appointment on behalf of the ward can 
rest entirely on the governing statute, and because no one is deemed to have 
a constitutional right to become a guardian for an incompetent adult. However, 
constitutional decisionmaking concerning incompetent adults in other contexts 
has established as a general principle that they possess constitutional rights 
equal or equivalent to those of competent adults and that state decisionmaking 
about fundamental aspects of their lives should aim first and foremost at 
exercising those rights on behalf of the incompetent adults, under the parens 
patriae authority of the state.85 
84. Emotional neglect is a recognized and serious form of maltreatment. See, e.g., In re 
Custody & Parental Rights of D.S., 122 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2005) (upholding the termination of 
parental rights of a methamphetamine-addicted mother based on chronic and severe emotional 
neglect). However, child protection agencies almost never intervene on that basis alone. 
85. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (noting with approval 
state court reasoning that "an incompetent person retains the same rights as a competent individual 
'because the value of human dignity extends to both"'); id. at 273 (noting with approval state court 
reasoning that "the right of self-determination should not be lost merely because an individual is 
unable to sense a violation of it" and that such a right could be "exercised by a surrogate decision 
maker" relying on evidence of what the person wanted when competent and/or on objective 
evidence of best interests); id. at 279-80 (recognizing that a competent adult has "a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition" and that an incompetent adult's identical 
right "must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate"); id. at 315-16 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the state's only legitimate interest in connection with cessation of 
treatment was "a parens patriae interest in providing Nancy Cruzan, now incompetent, with as accurate 
as possible a determination of how she would exercise her rights under these circumstances"); 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that a mentally retarded individual 
involuntarily committed to state institution had a constitutionally protected liberty interest to 
reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from umeasonable bodily restraints, and 
minimally adequate training). 
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The overall picture, therefore, is that the state never creates family legal 
relationships that could prejudice the private parties involved without their free 
and informed consent, or their imputed consent, or a proxy decision in their 
behalf based on what is best for them, except when it places newborn babies into 
legal parent~child relationships. Because the state assiduously respects the 
personhood of adults by requiring actual or proxy consents before creating such 
relationships for them, one simply does not find constitutional challenges to the 
state's creation of those relationships. 
2. State Refusal to Create Legal Relationships 
The constitutional challenges that have arisen, rather, have mostly 
involved the state refusing to create a legal relationship or to afford legal protec~ 
tion to a social relationship when certain private parties have requested it. 
Judicial responses to those challenges, as well as state law exclusions that 
have not been challenged, are of some relevance here insofar as they suggest 
general principles about necessary and sufficient constitutional conditions for 
the state creating relationships. 
States have refused requests for legal relationships by biological fathers, 
foster parents, homosexuals seeking a relationship with a child, and various 
types of couples wishing to marry. State law governing unwed biological 
fathers has shifted from a regime in which they could not be legal parents 
even if they wished, to one in which they are routinely made legal parents even if 
they do not wish. Common law imported from England simply excluded unwed 
fathers from legal paternity, reflecting an assumption that such men were unfit 
to raise children and/or unwelcome intruders into the lives of mothers and 
children.86 Conclusive marital presumptions applied to offspring of married 
women, and offspring of unmarried women simply had no father as far as 
the state was concerned.87 
After a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1972 (discussed 
further in Part III) created a constitutional right to legal parenthood for fit 
biological fathers who demonstrated commitment to the parental role,88 all states 
made it possible for unwed fathers to become legal parents in most circum~ 
stances. The "biology plus commitment plus fitness" test, insofar as it made 
assumption of responsibilities and fitness necessary conditions for having a 
86. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972) ("It may be, as the State insists, that 
most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents."); id. at 666 (Burger, J., dissenting) 
("(U)nwed fathers rarely burden either the mother or the child with their attentions."). 
87. See Murphy, supra note 29, at331-37. 
88. See infra notes 237-242 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional right, suggests consideration of parental deservingness and 
suitability in conferring constitutional rights. State laws authorizing adoption 
over a biological father's objection when he has failed to support or visit a baby 
or to enter his name in a putative father registry, or when the adoption court 
finds him unfit, mirror this test. But paternity statutes now go much farther than 
constitutional doctrine requires, conferring legal father status solely on the basis 
of biology. 
In contrast, when adults who are not biological parents have cared for a 
child and then sought a legal relationship with the child, courts have 
generally declined to attribute to such caregivers any constitutional right to 
be in such a relationship. Foster parents protesting removal of a child from 
their home lose out, because their claim usually competes with rights attributed 
to legal parents.89 When initial legal parents are out of the picture, on the 
other hand, judicial review of state laws denying a legal parent-child relationship 
to adults who want it generally focuses on the state's child-welfare justification 
for the denial. This was true, for example, of the Eleventh Circuit decision 
upholding Rorida's exclusion of homosexuals from adoption; the court's analysis 
focused on the effect on children of having homosexual parents.90 In addition, as 
noted in Part I, state statutes and regulations across the country deny entry 
into adoptive parent-child relationships on grounds of unfitness. Thus, with 
respect to any adults who are not biological parents, statutory law and 
constitutional doctrine relating to formation of legal parent-child relationships 
reflect an assumption that the state should not force children to be in parent-
child relationships that are bad for them. 
With respect to legal marriage, the most prominent example in recent 
years of state refusal to create that relationship even when there is mutual 
coment has been with respect to same-sex couples. The Supreme Court has 
yet to address the same-sex marriage issue, but in earlier times the Court 
addressed challenges to state laws refusing to allow polygamous marriages,91 
marriages to prison inmates/2 marriages to child support delinquents,93 and 
inter-racial marriages.94 Those challenges principally rested on equal protection 
claims, but the Court also spoke at times in substantive due process terms of 
a constitutional right to freedom in choosing whom one marries, and the Court 
has invalidated such laws absent a showing that they protected someone from 
89. See Smith v. Org. offuter Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 8!6, 846-47 (1977). 
90. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'yof(ep'tofChildren & Family, 358 FJd 804,818-26. (l!thCir. 2004). 
91. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) . 
92. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
93. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
94. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
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harm. In Loving v. Virginia,95 the Court invalidated a prohibition on inter-
racial marriage and explained that the Due Process Clause protects the "liberty" 
to marry, because "freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."96 
In this context, as well as in the context of extended family members sharing 
a household, the Court has specifically rejected as illegitimate a state aim of 
endeavoring to impose a single, popularly preferred model of family 
relationships.97 Exclusions from marriage on grounds of consanguinity, age, 
incompetence to consent, and pre-existing marriage (polygamy) are generally 
accepted today, because plausible welfare justifications exist. 
Judicial review of state refusal to create legal relationships thus reflects 
the principles ( 1) that the state may not interfere with private choices on 
arbitrarily discriminatory grounds, which would include a bare desire to 
make all families conform to a traditional model, and (2) that the state may 
refuse to create a relationship when doing so is likely to cause harm to a 
private party and should decline to create a relationship when one party is 
incompetent and the state has reason to believe that creating the relationship 
would be detrimental to that party or simply not beneficial. This lends 
further support to a conclusion that current parentage laws, insofar as they 
create legal relationships without regard for possible harm to a child, are 
anomalous and contrary to basic and well-established general constitutional and 
moral principles concerning state involvement in creating family relationships.98 
95. 388 u.s. 1 (1967). 
96. /d. at 12; see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383--87 (citing numerous cases in which the Court 
had spoken of freedom of choice in marriage as a fundamental right). 
97. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he 
Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all 
to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."). 
98. Current biology-based parentage laws might appear consistent with, or at least not 
incompatible with, constitutional doctrine in other contexts-in particular, Supreme Court decisions 
relating to sexual privacy and reproductive freedom. As discussed further below, a right to raise 
one's biological offspring does not necessarily follow from a right to have sex or a right to conceive 
children, as is evident from the Court's unwed father cases. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248, 260 ("'Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent 
and child."' (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979))). Thus, the Court could 
establish a right of newborns to avoid a relationship with unfit birth parents without overturning its 
precedents establishing those other rights. In any event, those precedents gave no consideration to 
the future personhood of children who might be created by exercise of the rights to sexual and 
reproductive freedom, so extrapolation from their analysis to conclusions about persons' constitu-
tional entitlement to raise offspring they produce would be unwarranted. 
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B. State Control of Private Association 
When the state places a newborn into a legal parent-child relationship 
with particular adults and confers custodial rights on those adults, it 
effectively compels the child to associate closely with those adults.99 From this 
perspective as well, because it fails to guard against association that endangers 
a child, state practice regarding the relational lives of newborn children is 
inconsistent with principles reflected in the law governing other relationships. 
That law relates to state-compelled association and state-prohibited association. 
1. State-Compelled Association 
As a general matter, individuals have a constitutionally-protected right 
to freedom of association, which entails both the freedom to associate and the 
freedom not to associate with others as one chooses.wo There is thus a consti-
tutional presumption against the state compelling any private person to 
associate with another, and the presumption is especially strong with respect 
to intimate association. 101 There is little constitutional doctrine explicitly 
addressing state-compelled intimate association, and what doctrine there is 
principally concerns large social organizations. In that context, the Supreme 
Court has held that the state may constitutionally prohibit such 
organizations from excluding persons from membership on the basis of race 
or sex, based on an assumption that persons' interest in controlling with 
whom they associate is much weaker in such social settings than it is in a 
family context.w2 This assumption enabled the Court to conclude that state 
interests in promoting race and gender equality are sometimes sufficient 
justification for limiting persons' freedom not to associate.w3 The Court 
99. State laws declare legal parents presumptive custodians of children. See, e.g., D.C. CODE 
ANN.§ 21-101 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 744.301 (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 33-15.1-1 (1995). 
100. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Freedom of association therefore 
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."). 
101. See id. at 620 ("[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power 
to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice of 
one's fellow employees."). 
102. See id. at 619-21. 
103. See id. The Court has also held, though, that such organizations have a First Amendment 
right against compelled association that would "affect[] in a significant way the group's ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints," absent a compelling state interest. Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (holding state "public accommodation" law's anti-discrimination law 
unconstitutional as applied to the Boy Scouts of America's policy of excluding homosexuals from 
leadership positions). 
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implied that there is, as a general matter, a much greater constitutional obstacle 
to state-compelled intimate association. 
There are, however, several types of routine state action other than 
creation of parent-child relationships that do amount to compelled intimate 
association. Though some involve other aspects of law governing parent-child 
relationships, some involve only adults. With respect to competent adults, 
compelled association today is largely limited to imprisonment, which does 
not aim directly at compelled inter-personal association (indeed, states might 
prefer prisoners not associate with each other at all), but rather at punishment 
and separation of convicted criminals from the general population. Yet it does 
entail forcing people to live in fairly cramped quarters with strangers, and can 
certainly impact their basic welfare. There is, however, strong constitutional 
protection against the state putting people in prison, overcome by the state 
showing it necessary to protect public safety. Moreover, the state is consti-
tutionally obligated to protect inmates to some degree from harm that might 
result from the forced association.104 
Two centuries ago, in America and elsewhere, there was another form of 
compelled association among competent adults, one involving family life and 
not involving criminals. Under coverture laws of marriage, the state gave 
husbands a legal right to cohabitation with their wives, and the state stood 
ready forcibly to return a wife who abandoned her husband. 105 States eliminated 
such laws well before the twentieth century, and no doubt if a state today 
tried to force a wife to live with her husband, a court would find that this violates 
the wife's right to liberty under the Due Process Clause, especially if the 
husband's known history or characteristics indicated the wife would be in danger. 
104. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (holding that segregated confinement 
did not implicate due process liberty interests, but indicating that inmates retain a substantive due 
process right that a state might violate by "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that a 
prison guard could be assessed punitive damages in a§ 1983 claim stemming from prison attack, for 
reckless indifference to the safety of prisoners); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979) (holding 
that housing two pre-trial detainees in a room intended for one did not violate due process rights, but 
stating in dicrum that "confining a given number of people in a given amount of space in such a manner as 
to cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might raise 
serious questions under the Due Process Clause"); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 (1978) 
(holding that the district court's award of attorney's fees to be paid out of the Department of Corrections' 
funds was supponed by bad faith and did not violate the Eleventh Amendment when conditions 
of prison isolation cells constiruted cruel and unusual punishment). 
105. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Conrest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. 
REv. 1373, 1390-91 (2000) ("A husband could also, with only modest limitations, legally restrict his 
wife's movements in the nineteenth cenrury-<:OUid conclusively determine where the couple would live, 
could physically restrain his wife to prevent her from leaving that household, and could retrieve her if 
she did stray, paiticularly if she had left to go to another man."). 
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Today the only persons compelled to associate with other members of their legal 
family are children. The law does not require any competent adults to associate 
with other adults with whom they stand in some form of legal family rela~ 
tionships, and the law never compels any adults to associate with any children.106 
With respect to incompetent adults, there is a kind of compelled 
association in involuntary commitment of mentally ill or mentally disabled per~ 
sons to residential treatment facilities. As with imprisonment, the compelled 
association with other persons so committed might not be the state's aim, but 
rather an unavoidable incident of confinement. There is often some intended 
compulsory association with non~residents, insofar as an institution might 
require patients to meet with treatment professionals. As in the case of impris~ 
onment, though, there is strong constitutional protection against commitment, 
requiring the state to show a compelling interest served by it,107 and against 
the institutions rendering patients vulnerable to harrn. 108 The Supreme Court 
stated in Youngberg v. Romeo: "If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold 
convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional [under 
the Due Process Clause] to confine the involuntarily committed-who may 
not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions."109 Yet the state routinely confines 
newborn babies in unsafe conditions when it places them into legal 
relationships with and the physical custody of unfit birth parents. 
In addition, there is a situation closely analogous to the parent-child 
situation in which the state directly and intentionally compels incompetent 
adults to associate with another adult-namely, when the state creates a 
guardian-ward relationship. A personal guardian is the legal custodian of the 
ward and accordingly has authority to decide where the ward lives, pursuant 
to which guardians can elect to have a ward live with them. It is not quite 
apt to characterize this as compelled association, though, because the 
106. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 937. Parents may not abandon their children in a manner 
that endangers them-for example, by leaving a child in a dumpster. But a birth mother could walk out 
of a hospital without the child and never see the child again, yet incur no penalty; if anything, the 
state would just eventually terminate her legal relationship with the child. See supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
107. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) (recognizing due process rights of 
prisoners regarding transfers to mental hospital); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) 
(holding that the state must prove the need for involuntary commitment of an adult by clear and 
convincing evidence); cf. Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 638 (1979) (holding that minors whose 
parents seek to place them in a mental hospital have a procedural due process right as to the neutral 
fact finder's independent evaluation of whether statutory criteria for admission are satisfied). 
108. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,314-19 (1982) (holding that persons involuntary 
committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded have a substantive due process right to safe 
conditions, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and minimally adequate training). 
109. I d. at 315-16. 
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appointment of the guardian reflects a proxy consent on behalf of the ward, 
and the law requires the guardian to act in the best interests of the ward. 110 A 
family member who thought it contrary to a ward's welfare to live with the 
guardian could file an objection with the appointing court, and the court 
could order a different residential situation for the ward based on a best 
interests finding or substituted judgment in behalf of the ward. This presump-
tively makes guardians' decisions to have a ward live with them a situation in 
which an actual, free choice by one party in the relationship (the guardian) 
is reciprocated with a proxy choice for the other party (the ward). 
Thus, as to adults' association with each other, the state never directly 
compels association except pursuant to an imputed, hypothetical choice on 
the part of an incompetent adult, and it compels association incidentally only 
when it must confine dangerous individuals in institutions. The substantive 
due process rights of competent and incompetent adults constrain the state 
in this context. In contrast, the state does not base its legislative decision to 
place children in the custody of birth parents without regard to fitness on a 
legislative finding that this is best for all children, or on any other finding 
that could be viewed as proxy consent for those whose birth parents are unfit. 
Such compelled association obviously is not necessary for public safety, and 
sometimes it is quite dangerous for children. Moreover, the state does not 
require parents to make residential choices or other parenting decisions based 
on the best interests of the child.''' And the state stands ready to return to 
the parents any child who attempts to leave or whom other private parties 
attempt to remove. 
There are also several situations, other than initial creation of the 
parent-child legal relationship, in which state law impacts the associationallives 
of children. One is when a child protective agency returns a child to parental 
custody after having taken custody following a maltreatment report. This kind of 
situation produced the constitutional tort claim against a child protective agency 
in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 112 on behalf of a 
child left permanently and severely brain damaged after the agency returned 
the child to an abusive father. In that decision, discussed further in Part III 
110. See PARRY & OROGIN, supra note 83, at 146; cf. In re Seyse, 803 A.2d 694, 700 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (assuming a guardian's relocation of a ward to be proper if consistent with the 
ward's best interests, citing court holdings in other jurisdictions that the guardian's choice of residence 
must be in ward's best interests). 
Ill. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,304 (1993) ("'[T)he best interests ofthe child' is nor the 
legal standani that governs parents' or guardians' exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum 
requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of 
other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves."). 
112. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
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below, the Court did not reach the question of what substantive due process 
right the child had against being forced to live with an abusive father, because a 
majority concluded that there was no state action. It arrived at that conclusion 
by focusing not on the agency's return of the child to paternal custody but 
rather on the agency's failure to remove the child again. 113 The state agency, in 
the Court's view, had simply failed to act to protect one private party from 
another private party, which the state generally is not constitutionally obligated 
to do. 114 
In the similar context of placing children in the custody of foster 
parents, however, children do receive constitutional protection. Courts have 
established that the state is acting when it places a child in a foster care rela-
tionship and that the state, while not precluded from placing children into 
such unchosen associations, is constitutionally required to do so with some 
care. Some courts apply a "professional judgment" standard, whereas others 
impose liability on an agency that acts with "deliberate indifference" to 
dangers the placement might pose for the child. 115 Thus, were a state to select 
foster parents with the same disregard for child maltreatment history, drug 
addiction, or severe mental illness that it shows when making birth parents 
legal parents (for example, by choosing the first person to respond to a 
newspaper ad), courts would conclude that it violated a constitutional right 
of any children harmed as a result. Accordingly, state statutes require child 
protection agencies to investigate any applicants for foster parent positions 
and require that courts find foster parents fit and qualified prior to placing a 
child with them. 116 
An additional context in which the state compels intimate association 
for children is when parents do not live together. The decision as to who will 
be a custodial parent following divorce, when two parents with presumptively 
equal rights compete with each other, is ostensibly based on children's best 
interests. 117 Once a court has assigned primary custody to one parent, however, 
the noncustodial parent is deemed to have a constitutional right to visitation 
with the child, and courts will require a child to visit that parent absent a 
113. Id. at201. 
114. Id. at 196-97. 
115. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 809-12 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting a "deliberate 
indifference" standard and citing decisions of other courts applying similar standard); Clark K. 
v. Guinn, No. 2:06-CV-1068-RCJ-RJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 1435428, at *15 (D. Nev. May 14, 2007) 
(adopting a professional judgment standard and citing decisions of other courts that had done so); Kenny 
A. v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS, 2004 U.S. Dist. WL 5503780, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 
2004) (adopting a professional judgment standard). 
116. See Survey, Standards far Foster Care Families, Westlaw 50 State Statutory Surveys (2006). 
117. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 907-11. 
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showing that it would be seriously harmful to the child; showing just that it 
would on balance be better for the child not to associate with the noncustodial 
parent is legally insufficient.118 On the other side, courts never order an indiffer-
ent noncustodial parent to visit a child.119 
A final form of compelled intimate association is between siblings. 
Parents legally can compel association between siblings while they are minors, 
as an aspect of parents' state-conferred control over each child's life. 110 Only 
when the siblings' parents live apart might a court decide, on the basis of each 
child's best interests, that the children should not have to live with each other or 
even interact with each other. 111 Generally, though, it is in siblings' best inter-
ests to live with and interact with each other, and the state does protect that 
interest in divorce and foster care contexts.m 
2. State-Prevented Association 
Conversely, states have at times endeavored to preclude assoctatton 
between some competent persons who wish to have a relationship. Texas, for 
instance, prosecuted a couple for violating its anti-sodomy laws, but the Supreme 
Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 recognized that anti-sodomy laws are about much 
more than sex, that they in fact amount to denying freedom of choice in 
forming and maintaining intimate relationships. 114 The Court announced a 
general, constitutionally protected right to enjoy such freedom absent harm 
to others.125 In a different context, the Court has given local governments sub-
stantial freedom to control residential patterns for various reasons, but has invali-
dated some zoning provisions because they interfered with private parties' freedom 
to carry on healthy family-like relationships with persons of their choosing.126 
Lastly, states sometimes prohibit certain people from associating at all 
with certain others. This could be because the parties were previously partners 
in crime. More commonly it is because the former might do harm to the latter; 
courts impose protective orders requiring persons who have been violent or who 
appear likely to commit violence to stay away from past or potential victims, 
118. See id. at 932-37 . 
119. See id. at 937. 
120. See id. at 970. 
121. See id. at 967. 
122. See id. at 966--69. 
123. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
124. See id . at 567. 
125. ld . at 567, 574 (referring to "the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of 
the person in making these choices"-namely, "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education"). 
126. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 ( 1977) (plurality opinion). 
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most commonly wives or girlfriends. 127 Such orders effectuate a right of adults to 
avoid unwanted and harmful associations. Significantly, adults who have 
committed sexual or violent offenses against a child will commonly be 
prohibited from associating at all with any children-other than their own 
offspring.128 Ironically, this is true even if the prior victim was their own offspring! 
A sex offender must register with local police and in many jurisdictions may not 
live near a school or other place where children regularly congregate.129 An 
adult identified with a child maltreatment history typically will not be permitted 
to work in a school in any capacity or even to serve as a coach for a youth 
sports team.130 Yet the state generally allows sexual predators and adults with 
horrible child maltreatment histories to associate in the most private and unsu, 
pervised of settings with any later offspring they have. 
The law governing state efforts denying association between private 
parties thus reflects the principles (a) that persons have a constitutional right 
to associate with others on the basis of mutual consent unless their doing so 
poses some danger and, correspondingly, (b) that states may prohibit association 
when it has a compelling welfare justification for doing so. State laws precluding 
babies born to unfit parents from immediately forming family relationships 
with other adults who are prepared to be good parents arguably (if one accepts 
that a hypothetical or imputed choice on the part of the child could substitute 
for actual consent) are inconsistent with principle (a), and principle (b) suggests 
that courts should find no constitutional obstacle to a state deciding no longer to 
confer legal parenthood on unfit birth parents. 
C. Summary 
In sum, there is a constitutional presumption against the state compelling 
any private person to associate with another, a presumption especially strong 
127. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 19-13-4 (2004 &Supp. 2008); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2919.26 
(West 1994 & Supp. 2008). 
128. See, e.g, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.2 (1950 & Supp. 2008). 
129. See Katie Zezima, After Rape, Calls ro Umir Where Sex Offerulers Go, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2008, at A9 (discussing calls for local ordinances to prohibit sex offenders from libraries and other 
public places). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offeruler Registration and Community Notification: 
Pasr, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2008); Wayne 
A. Logan, Consritutional CoUecrivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L REv. 1 (2006). 
130. Cf. National School Safety and Security Services, School Employee & School Teacher 
Background Checks, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/teacher_background_checks.html 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (encouraging schools to conduct more thorough background checks); 
USA Track & Field (USATF), Criminal Background Check Program, Frequendy Asked 
Questions, http://www.usatf.org/about/programs/backgroundChecks/FAQ.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 
2009) (providing information regarding a screening program for youth coaches). 
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in connection with intimate association. Accordingly, in most contexts, the 
state must have strong justification when it does compel intimate association. 
Public safety justifies imprisoning criminals and involuntarily committing 
some mentally ill persons. A best interests finding is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for assigning custody of an incompetent adult to a guardian. Even 
with respect to children, the law recognizes a constitutional constraint in 
some contexts, such as foster care, on the state's power to compel them to 
associate in intimate settings with others, a constraint that is violated if the 
state has reason to know the association would threaten a child's welfare. 
Again, maternity and paternity laws, coupled with child custody laws, stand 
out as anomalies, inconsistent with general constitutional and moral 
principles applied in every other domain of intimate life. Part Ili.C below 
considers whether there is something unique about state parentage 
decisionmaking that justifies this inconsistency. 
Significantly, many federal and state legislators are well aware that some 
birth parents pose a real danger to their offspring, and some have publicly 
decried the continued consignment of newborn babies to the legal and 
physical custody of unfit birth parents, as an injustice to the children as well as a 
. quite costly public policy.131 They have mustered enough political will to take 
some modest steps toward avoiding this injustice and social cost (examples 
include the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997132 and the Keeping Children 
and Families Safe Act of 2003m), but not enough to make meaningful change. 
It is precisely in a situation such as this, where the political process fails to 
protect the most vulnerable citizens from the worst harms, that constitutional 
protection is most needed and appropriate. Child welfare advocates have not yet 
articulated and asserted a constitutional right of newborn babies against the 
state forcing them into legal relationships with unfit parents. The remainder of 
this Article demonstrates how they could do so. 
III. CHILDREN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT AGAINST BAD 
PARENT AGE DECISIONS 
As an initial matter, a newborn baby clearly can and does possess consti-
tutional rights against the state. The Supreme Court has made clear that 
children are persons who have rights under the federal Constitution.134 Thus, 
131. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 435-37. 
132. Pub. L 105-89, Ill Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C §§ 673b, 678, 679b (ZOOO)) . 
133. Pub. L 108-36, 117 Stat. 800. 
134. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (adjudicating a non-fundamental right of 
juvenile aliens to be held in a private custodial setting); id. at 316 (O'Connor, )., concurring) 
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were a state's laws to declare, for example, that doctors must euthanize babies 
born with particular physical deformities, no one would doubt that the state 
thereby violated a constitutional right of those babies. Some might say the 
state violates a right of the babies' parents, but they would be hard pressed 
to deny that the state violates some right of the babies as well. Likewise, if a 
state's laws dictated that babies with red hair be shipped immediately to Ireland, 
all would perceive a violation of those babies' constitutional rights, even though 
the babies themselves would not protest. And if a state's parentage statutes 
directed that the first legal parent for any newborn left at a safe haven depository 
shall be an unmarried male sex-offender just released from prison, we would 
charge the state with an atrocious abuse of state power and a violation of the 
abandoned babies' rights against the state. It would not matter that legislators 
were motivated in passing such laws by compassion for such men, who were 
likely abused as children themselves and who might otherwise never have an 
opportunity to raise a child, given that they are relatively unattractive to 
women as potential partners. The Constitution simply does not permit 
legislatures to use babies in that way to ease the suffering of adults. This is so 
even though we recognize that the state must establish some legal rules as to 
who will be the legal parents and custodians of newborn children. That the 
state inevitably must intrude into babies' intimate lives to the extent of 
choosing legal and custodial parents for them does not mean that it is 
constitutionally unconstrained in how it does so. 
The most fitting articulation of a constitutional right of newborns against 
the state in relation to parentage statutes would be in terms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, which commands that no State may "deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Federal 
courts lump most allegations of state-inflicted injury other than killing or 
property confiscation under the deprivation of liberty rubric, regardless of 
("Children, too, have a core liberty interest in remaining free from institutional confinement. In this 
respect, a child's constitutional '[Oreedom from bodily restraint' is no narrower than an adult's." 
(quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) 
("It is not disputed that a child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being 
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the state's involvement in the commitment 
decision constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 674 (1977) ("[W]here school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately 
decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical 
pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 157 (1973) (indicating that the multiple uses of "person" in the Constitution apply to humans 
following birth); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding 
First Amendment speech rights of public high school students); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-
72 (1968) (recognizing an equal protection right of illegitimate children against being denied 
wrongful death action as to parent). 
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whether the alleged injury amounts to denial of free choice or action. The 
Supreme Court has stated that the Due Process Clause "guarantees more than 
fair process, and the 'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of 
h · 1 · "135 Th Cl h b d "' h p ystca restramt. e ause serves t e roa er purpose to secure t e 
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."' 136 
Courts have thus included under the heading of "liberty" several other rights 
that do not fit the usual understanding of liberty, including a right against 
incursions on one's bodily integrity; a power to make controlling decisions 
about the life of another human being-namely, one's legal child; and a right 
to compel the state to establish a legal relationship between adult intimate 
partners. 137 Indeed courts have addressed state action affecting children and incom-
petent adults in other contexts under this heading, including potentially 
harmful custodial placements. us In those contexts, courts have construed the pro-
tection of liberty to require not just that the state stay out of certain private 
realms altogether, but also that when the state must enter into a private 
realm, because an individual is incapable of self-determining choices and 
actions, it not do so arbitrarily or in a manner that disrespects the personhood of 
that individuaL 139 
Having established that newborn children can possess substantive due 
process rights against the state, the next question is what sort of state actions 
in fact do so. Not every state law or action or decision by a state actor that 
substantially impacts a newborn baby's life is such a violation. For example, 
the state would do no wrong to abandoned babies by creating a parent-child 
relationship between them and biologically unrelated persons who apply to a 
state agency to become parents, who pass through a rigorous qualifying 
process, and who are the best available parents for the children, because 
doing so would cause the babies no injury. What is needed are basic principles 
135. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). 
136. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Hunado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516,527 (1884)). 
13 7. See generally Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. 
Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71 (2006). 
138. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-19 (1982) (holding that persons 
involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded have a substantive due 
process right to safe conditions, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and minimally adequate 
training); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) (holding that the involuntary transfer of a 
prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a libeny interest protected by the Due Process Clause); 
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 (upholding the practice of corporal punishment in public schools, but 
acknowledging that the Due Process Clause guards the "right to be free from and to obtain judicial 
relief, for unjustified intrusions on personal security"); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (stating in dicta that 
school regulations can infringe a libeny interest of students protected by the Due Process Clause). 
139. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674. 
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by which to judge when a particular state action toward babies is a constitutional 
wrong, given that some state actions clearly would violate substantive due 
process rights of newborn babies while other state actions clearly would not. 
The principles distilled from statutory and doctrinal law relating to state 
creation of legal relationships and state-compelled association in Part II provide 
some guidance, which I incorporate in this Part into a step-by-step application of 
the Supreme Court's basic approach to recognizing and applying substantive due 
process rights. 
A. The State Action Question 
As a preliminary matter, there can be no violation of babies' substantive 
due process rights if there is no state action. As explained above, initial 
legal parenthood arises by statute and, in a substantial percentage of cases, by 
court decree. Legislating, executive implementation of statutes, and judicial 
decisionmaking are obviously state actions. A challenge to the constitutionality 
of state parentage decisionmaking should therefore have no difficulty satisfying 
the state action requirement. A legal representative for a newborn whose birth 
parents are unfit would assert that the state's parentage statute, as applied and 
enforced with respect to this child, violates the child's Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, and it would be implausible for the state to respond that its application 
of its statutes does not constitute state action. 
However, to constitutional law scholars, a complaint about the state's 
decision to place a child into a legal relationship with and in the custody of 
an unfit birth parent will be reminiscent of the complaint in Deshaney140 about 
the state's failure to protect a child from an abusive parent, so it is worth emphasiz-
ing why Deshaney does not pose a problem for the claim developed here. In 
Deshaney, the Court held that a county child protection agency did not violate 
the constitutional rights of a boy whose father beat him to the point of causing 
severe brain damage, by failing to remove the boy from his father's custody 
even though the agency had reason to believe the boy was in danger. The 
basis for the Court's rejection of the § 1983 claim was that there was no state 
action, but rather only a failure to act. 
The Deshaney Court's analysis is subject to serious challenge on its own 
terms. In particular, the Court failed to acknowledge the state's role in 
creating the situation in which Joshua Deshaney was harmed-that is, by 
the child protection agency repeatedly removing Joshua from a safe foster 
home and depositing him in his abusive father's home, and by the legislature 
140. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
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conferring legal parent status on Randy Deshaney in the first place. More 
importantly for present purposes, the Deshaney decision is also readily 
distinguishable. The attorney retained by Joshua Deshaney's mother directed 
the complaint only against the child protection agency, alleged only a failure 
to act, and mistakenly conceded that the State played no part in creating 
the danger to the boy. 141 Accordingly, the Court treated the claim as one to 
state agency protection from a private harm that the state played no role 
in creating, and held that the Constitution does not confer such positive 
rights to state assistance. 142 The Court indicated that the outcome would likely 
be different if Joshua's attorney had shown that the state had by affirmative 
conduct created a danger or vulnerability for the child. 143 Following Deshaney, 
most circuit courts of appeal have adopted a "state-created danger" rule for a 
§ 1983 claim that is based on harmful private conduct, and the most common 
articulation of the rule requires a plaintiff to show that state actors assisted in 
creating or increasing danger of private harm when they knew or should have 
known of the danger. 144 
A challenge to parentage laws, in contrast, would focus directly on 
affirmative conduct by the state-namely, the legislature's passage of state 
statutes determining every child's first legal relationships and bestowing custodial 
rights on the adult parties to that relationship, state agencies' implementation 
of those statutes, and courts' application of those statutes in individual cases. 
The initial creation of a legal and custodial parent-child relationship is as much 
state action as is creating a guardian-ward relationship, whether it occurs by 
operation of a statute over a large number of cases or by judicial decision in 
an individual case. Similarly, if a state passed a statute declaring that any two 
adults who live in the same household are ipso facto legally married, and are 
therefore subject to all the legal duties that marriage entails, no one would 
141. "Petitioner sued respondents claiming that their failure to act deprived him of 
his liberty .... " Id. at 191. "The complaint alleged that respondents had deprived Joshua of his 
liberty ... by failing to intervene" after they had undertaken "to protect Joshua from this danger-
which petitioners concede the State played no part in creating." Id. at 193-97. 
142. Id. at 196 (asserting that the purpose of the Due Process Clause is "to protect the people 
from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other" and that the Clause 
"confer[s] no affirmative right to government aid"); id. at 197 ("[A] State's failure to protect an 
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process 
Clause."); id. at 201 (referring to "a danger it concededly played no part in creating"); id. at 203 
("The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did 
nothing .... "). 
143. See id. at 200-DZ. 
144. See Matthew D. Barrett, Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Consistent 
'State-Created Danger' Analysis far Establishing Constitutional Viokuions Under Section 1983, 3 7 VAL. U. 
L. REv. 177, 188-210 (2002). 
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have difficulty seeing the state action, even though it comprised automatic 
operation of a statutory rule over a large number of cases. Further, state creation 
of legal and custodial parent-child relationships is a state action that, in the 
case of unfit parents, creates a danger for the child that would not otherwise 
exist, because those adults would not otherwise be legally free to take the child 
into their household and assume control over the child's life. 145 And, because of 
the exclusivity and plenary power that the state injects into legal parenthood, 
such state action entails cutting off potential private sources of protection, 
including assumption of custody by other adults who are prepared to provide a 
very nurturing upbringing. Analogously, if the state gave legal effect to private 
marriage ceremonies between men and ten-year-old girls, few would have 
difficulty perceiving how this state action endangers and potentially violates 
constitutional rights of the children, because of the liberties and rights that 
marriage would confer on the men. 
Few people would have difficulty seeing how creation of a legal parent-
child relationships constitutes potentially wrongful state action in the case of 
adoption-that is, if a social services agency and court were to grant adoption 
of a newborn to persons the state knew to be grossly unfit to parent. Imagine an 
adult, reported in the newspapers today for throwing a crying baby against 
a brick wall, going tomorrow to a local social services agency and applying to 
adopt any available baby. Were the agency and a court to approve such an adop-
tion, we would readily discern state action and would ascribe responsibility 
to the state if that adult then threw the adopted baby against the same brick 
wall. Creating a legal parent-child relationship between a newborn and birth 
parents who are grossly unfit is no less state action. It is certainly more clearly 
state action than is a state agency declining to create a legal relationship desired 
by private parties, such as a legal marriage between persons of the same sex, 
yet courts have unhesitatingly treated such refusal to create a legal relationship 
as state action. 
145. I assume here the existence of kidnapping prohibitions, which should preclude any adults 
without special legal license from taking possession of a child and holding the child in their home. 
In the absence of such prohibitions, and in the absence of laws conferring legal parent status on other 
persons, unfit birth parents might be legally free to take and retain possession of their offspring. 
However, without state-conferred legal parent status and the powers it entails, they could not invoke 
the assistance of the state in preventing others from taking the child instead, because others would 
also be legally free to do so, and others might be especially motivated to take possession of a baby if 
they perceived the birth parents' unfitness. Such state-of-nature speculation is not especially 
illuminating, in my view, because the notion of a society devoid of parentage and kidnapping 
laws is utterly unrealistic, so the more likely alternative is that the state would assign legal parent 
status to other persons who are fit to parent. Relative to that alternative, a state decision to confer 
legal parent status and physical custody rights on unfit birth parents creates a danger that otherwise 
would not exist. 
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B. Establishing the Substantive Right 
The greater obstacle to establishing a substantive due process right of 
newborns against the state forcing them into parent-child relationships with 
unfit parents is this: If it is a new constitutional right, federal courts would apply a 
fairly strong presumption against recognizing it as a fundamental right triggering 
strict constitutional scrutiny-that is, trumping legislation that is not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 146 A nonfundamental (i.e., 
less important or weighty) substantive due process right might also trump 
a parentage law, if that law does not have a "reasonable fit" with a legitimate 
government purpose, 147 but one who alleges a substantive due process violation 
is in a far weaker position if the claim rests on what the Court deems only a 
nonfundamental right. 148 And the Supreme Court, concerned with excessive 
restriction on democratic decisionmaking and with judges injecting their 
personal policy preferences into constitutional interpretation, has stated that 
courts should "exercise the utmost care whenever asked to break new ground" 
in the field of fundamental substantive due process rights. 149 
There are at least two reasons, however, why in this context the Court 
might be less reluctant to recognize a new right or to apply an old right in a 
new way. First, the democratic process is less likely in this context than in others 
to ensure full legislative consideration of the private interests most affected by 
state action. 150 The persons most affected-newborn babies-have no direct 
voice. Ordinarily parents might represent children's interests in the political 
process, but unfit birth parents might have desires at odds with their 
offsprings' welfare. Other adults need not worry about ever becoming part of this 
class, so have no self-regarding incentive to advocate for this class's rights. In 
contrast, those who are competent adults now might someday enter into a 
different class of incompetent persons-namely, incompetent adults in need 
146. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1970). 
14 7. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305--06 (1993 ). 
148. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 417 
(2006) (noting that the application of strict scrutiny depends in part on the designation of a right as 
fundamental, and that the applied level of scrutiny is likely to determine the outcome of the case). 
149. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963) 
("We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."). 
150. See Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority Rule, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 23, 28-29 (2006) 
("(W]hen the Court has concerns about the integrity of legislative process, it consistently responds 
with aggressive interpretations of substantive constitutional standards that are within its sphere of 
enforcement, such as individual rights provisions."); id at 31-32 (explaining that two of the three 
principal rationales typically given for majority rule are that it ensures consideration of every person's 
interests or preferences and that it produces government based on the consent of the governed). 
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of a guardian. Accordingly, the democratic process has produced statutory 
protections for that class. In terms of the basic rationale for having consti-
tutional rights against majoritarian decisionmaking, it is thus ironic that courts 
have attributed to incompetent adults but not to newborn babies constitutional 
rights regarding state creation of relationships and custodial placement. 
Simply put, the legislative process does not naturally respect and reflect 
the equal personhood of babies born to unfit parents and is especially likely to 
produce outcomes that are unjustifiable from the standpoint of those children.151 
Only rigorous judicial review, forcing legislatures to provide convincing reasons 
for their decisions as to the fate of vulnerable newborns, can effectuate the most 
basic political right of those children to treatment as equal citizens. For 
the Court to announce that the political process is the proper recourse for babies 
consigned by states to lives with drug addicts or violent child abusers would 
be disingenuous. 
The second reason why the Court should be less reluctant to recognize this 
new right is that the kind of state decision the right would constrain-namely, 
choosing family members for a person-is one the state presumptively should 
never be making in the first place. Such a decision is an extreme incursion into a 
citizen's private life. The state makes it solely because the newborn's incompe-
tence and vulnerability necessitate some entity making decisions for them about 
their family relationships. Incapacity and vulnerability do not necessitate and do 
not justify the state using their lives to serve the common good or to gratify the 
wishes of other private parties (namely, unfit birth parents). Just as the self-
determining choices we adults make about our intimate relationships, in the 
pursuit of our own happiness, receive constitutional protection from majoritarian 
preferences and prejudices, choices made on behalf of newborns to advance 
their welfare and enhance their prospects for a happy life should receive such 
protection as well. No doubt, if some state changed its guardianship rules 
to eliminate the best interests standard for guardian appointment and began 
appointing personal guardians without regard to fitness, courts would recognize a 
fundamental substantive due process right of adults against the state placing 
them in the custody of persons grossly unfit as caretakers-for example, persons 
known to have severely abused another incompetent adult. 
151. Cf. id. at 33-35 (explaining that an assumption of universal equal personhood underlies 
all the main justifications for majoritarian decisionmaking); Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated 
Rights Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 121, 143 (2006) ("At the core of the 
constitutional-contractarian approach to the justification of political coercion stands a liberal's insis· 
tence on the normative primacy-that is, as objects of moral concern--of notionally free and 
equal individuals; hence the demand that potentially coercive political acts be acceptable from the 
standpoints of each ... of countless persons among whom conflicts of interest and vision abound." 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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The Supreme Court has taken two approaches to identifying consti-
tutionally protected fundamental rights under the substantive due process 
rubric. The Court's most recent major substantive due process decision, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 152 appeared to adopt and apply them both. 153 Under the 
"history and tradition" approach, which has predominated in recent decades, 
the Court demands "a careful description of the asserted right"154 and then 
examines whether it is among the "fundamental rights and liberties which 
are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if they were sacrificed."155 Based on this conservative approach to 
rights recognition, the Court has in the past refused to recognize as a fundamen-
tal liberty a right to physician-assisted suicide,156 a right of unwed biological 
fathers to challenge a marital presumption of patemity,157 and a right of 
consenting adults to engage in homosexual activity. 158 
Th . 1 . . h " d . d "159 h d e mama ternattve 1st e reasone JU gment approac , un er 
which the Court aims to strike a proper balance between individual liberty 
and "'the demands of organized society.'"160 It has done this in part by taking 
into account the importance of the interests at stake, and in part by "'having 
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which [this country] 
developed ::J.S well as the traditions from which it broke."' 161 The Court 
sometimes measures the importance of private interests in welfare terms (for 
instance, the material burdens of pregnancy and child-rearing) and sometimes 
in metaphysical terms (for instance, the importance that defining one's own 
concept of existence has to enjoying a flourishing human life). 162 The more 
152. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
153. See Daniel 0. Conlde, Three Thearies of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REv. 63, 117-21 
(2006). Conkle discerns in Lawrence a third approach to identification of fundamental rights, which 
he tenns a "theory of evolving national values." Id. at 67-68. However, the Court might better be 
viewed as simply making recent history more relevant to the "history and tradition" inquiry than 
earlier history. 
154. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,302 (1993). 
155. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted). 
156. See id. at 728. 
157. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
158. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
159. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). 
160. Id. at 850 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting)). 
161. Id.; see also David D. Meyer, Self-Definitian in the Canstitutian of Faith and Family, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 791,805-06 (2002). 
162. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(invoking "the centrality of 'the decision whether ro bear ... a child' to a woman's 'dignity and 
autonomy,' her 'personhood' and 'destiny,' her 'conception of ... her place in society"'); Conkle, 
supra note 153, at 101 (discussing the majority's analysis in Roe); id. at 104-05 (discussing Casey). 
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central the interest is to human well-being or flourishing, the more likely Justices 
who take this approach are to categorize it as a fundamental interest warranting 
rigorous substantive due process protection. This approach does not disregard 
tradition, but views it as an evolving or "living thing," and finds significance both 
in society adhering to long-standing practices and in its explicit rejection or 
simple abandonment of once-prevailing practices.163 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence captures this outlook: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components 
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times 
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws 
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As 
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke 
principles in their own search for greater freedom. 164 
Using this latter approach, the Court has established fundamental rights to use 
b 'rth 1165 ha bo . 166 d . h l d 167 1 contra , to ve an a rtton, an to engage m omosexua con uct, 
rights that relate to the most intimate aspects of life but that did not find 
much support in American history and tradition. 
I assess below the prospects under each approach for a fundamental right 
of newborn babies against the state consigning them to family relationships 
with unfit birth parents, and then, supposing the right were to be recognized, I 
consider what justifications a state might offer for infringing it. Though the 
reasoned judgment approach presents the clearer case, the case for establishing 
such a right is actually strong under both approaches. 
1. Grounding a Newborn's Right in History and Tradition 
The Court has not made clear what it means to give a "'careful description' 
of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" prior to looking for a tradition of 
protecting it. 168 Justice Scalia's prescription for defining the interest or right has 
the virtue of making the historical investigation as manageable as possible; he 
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
164. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,578-79 (2003). 
165. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 550 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972) (involving binh control for unmarried persons). 
166. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1970) (involving abonion for adults); Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (involving abonion for minors). 
167. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (involving homosexual conduct). 
168. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 
292,302 (1993)). 
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advocates articulating the right at "the most specific level at which a relevant 
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be 
identified."169 Other members of the Court have objected that this allows too 
little room for extension of basic principles to new contexts, but they have not 
articulated a clear alternative approach or clear principles by which judges 
might gauge the appropriate level of specificity.170 
Two such principles come readily to mind. One is that the asserted right 
should not be so vague that its pronouncement would invite a flood of challenges 
to state action that cripple govemment,171 or would make too unpredictable what 
state actions courts would deem to run afoul of it. 171 By that principle, the Court 
has been correct to reject such formulations of fundamental rights as a right to 
'"self-sovereignty"' or freedom in "'basic and intimate exercises of personal 
"'
173 
• h "f d fr h · I . "174 d " . h b autonomy, a ng t to ree om om p ystca restramt, an a ng t to e 
let alone."175 
A second principle, aimed at avoiding too specific an articulation, would 
be that courts should not characterize the right so narrowly that they make 
morally irrelevant facts determinative and simply perpetuate a societal practice 
of arbitrarily denying to some disfavored or powerless group of persons a kind of 
legal protection generally afforded to others. 176 Unless a group's salient charac-
169. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
170. Compare id . at 127-28 n.6 (plurality opinion) ("[T)he dissent has no basis for the level of 
generality it would select"), with id . at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("On occasion the 
Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might 
not be 'the most specific level' available ... . I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior 
imposition of a single mode of historical analysis."). 
171. See Randy E. Barnett, Wlw's Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17 
(2006) ("If all liberty was protected equally, regulation would cease and, with it, most government 
functions . ... "). 
172. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6 {plurality opinion) ("(L]eaving judges free to decide as 
they think best when the unanticipated occurs ... is no rule of law at all.") . 
173 . Glucksberg,521 U.S. at724. 
174. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,302 (1993) . 
175 . Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) {quoting 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
176. See In reMarriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) ("None of the foregoing 
decisions-in emphasizing the importance of undertaking a "careful description' of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest' ([Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721))-suggests, however, that it is appropriate 
to define a fundamental constitutional right or interest in so narrow a fashion that the basic 
protections afforded by the right are withheld from a class of persons ... who historically have been 
denied the benefit of such rights .... In this regard, we agree with ... Chief Judge Kaye of the New 
York Court of Appeals in her dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles, [855 N.E.2d 1, 23 (N.Y. 
2006)): '[F)undamental rights, once recognized, cannot be denied to particular groups on the ground 
that these groups have historically been denied those rights.' {Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana [419 U.S. 522, 
537 (1975)) ["it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given 
automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that criminal jury venires are almost 
totally male .... If it was ever the case that women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so 
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teristic is a plausible basis for maintaining that irs members are less deserving or 
needful than other persons of the protection sought, the characteristic is morally 
irrelevant and description of the right should not make reference to the group or 
to the particular context in which irs members would exercise the right. This 
principle finds support in the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection 
dimension; characterizing the claims of disfavored, politically powerless groups 
in unduly narrow terms, to ensure that the claim finds no support in tradition, 
smacks of invidious discrimination. This principle makes sense also because the 
substantive due process quest is supposed to be for a protected liberty, not for a 
protected group. 
Based on this second principle, it would have been improper for the 
Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, 177 for example, to characterize the interest 
of the parents involved as "an interest in having one's children instructed in 
German," an interest that would likely have failed the history test. The 
parents' being of German heritage rather than some other was not morally 
relevant. Of course, whether a group's characteristic is morally relevant will 
sometimes be contested, as is evident in the Court's decisions concerning 
anti-sodomy laws, 178 but other times it will be fairly clear. The most forceful 
proponent of the "history and tradition" approach on the current Court, 
Justice Scalia, has sometimes applied it in a manner consistent with this 
principle. For example, in his Michael H. plurality opinion, he specified the 
right claimed as a right of a biological unwed father to claim legal parenthood 
as to a child being raised by a mother and her husband, and he noted the 
morally relevant fact that the biological father's claim would have the effect of 
disrupting a functional family. 179 Scalia thereby left open the possibility that an 
situated that none of them should be required to perform jury service, that time has long since 
passed"]."); cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland , 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
("[H)istory counsels caution and restraint . But it does not counsel abandonment, nor does it 
require . . . cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary 
boundary .... ") ). A similar, third principle might be that the articulation of the right should not be 
so narrow as to preclude application of well-established constitutional norms to novel contexts that 
arise as society evolves, absent constant amendment of the Constitution. New forms of state action 
occasioned by medical advances are an example. It was proper for the Court in Cruzan v. Missouri 
Department of Health to characterize the interest at stake as an "interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment," 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), rather than as something like "an interest in not receiving 
hydration while in a persistent vegetative state." 
177. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
178. See Conkle, supra note 153, at 92-93. 
179. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US. 110, 125 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("We have found 
nothing in the older sources, nor in the older cases, addressing specifically the power of the narural father to 
assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man."); id. at 129 n. 7 
("[l]t is at least pa;sible that our traditions lead to a different conclusion with regard to adulterous fathering 
of a child whom the marital parents do not wish to raise as their own."). 
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unwed father might have a protected interest if the mother were also 
unmarried at the time of the paternity action. 
With respect to newborn children, a description of their right relating 
to parentage at the vague end of the spectrum might be something like a funda-
mental right against the state diminishing one's welfare, or a right against the 
state forcing one into a bad situation. Those clearly would be unworkable. At 
the specific end of the spectrum might be something like a fundamental right of 
newborns not to be made the legal child of a birth parent who has previously 
had rights terminated as to another child (or who is addicted to methampheta-
mines, etc.). That formulation of a right could be quite feasible to implement, 
but historical records are unlikely to contain much mention of such 
specific circumstances. 
An articulation of the right just a bit more general than this and the one 
I have used throughout the article-that is, "a right of newborn children against 
the state placing them into legal relationships with and the physical custody 
of unfit birth parents"-might satisfy even Justice Scalia. For one can find 
substantial historical evidence of states reacting to what they viewed as parental 
unfitness, in many cases by denying legal parent status in the first instance to 
birth parents deemed unfit. The evidence supports recognition of this right of 
children to a much greater extent than one unfamiliar with the history of child 
protection might suppose. 
In fact, "[e]fforts to protect children from abuse and neglect are as old as 
maltreatment itself."180 Before the sixteenth century, these efforts were mostly 
exerted by private institutions and principally entailed exhortation and 
assistance; the Christian church prohibited members from mistreating children 
in certain ways and charities offered services to help parents care for children. 181 
But for at least the past four centuries, the state in the English-speaking world 
has exerted extensive parens patriae authoriry over child rearing and has endeav-
ored to ensure that children are not raised by unfit parents.182 
The practice of denying legal parenthood in the first instance to biological 
parents is most clearly evidenced by the law's treatment of unwed fathers. As 
noted in Part II, for most of American history the state deemed unwed fathers 
per se unfit and accordingly denied them legal parent status. 183 In other cases 
180. jOHN E. B. MYERS, A HISTORY OF CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA 19 (2004 ). 
181. See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 116-17 (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. 
Duquette eds., 2005). 
182. See generally jOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FLJTURE 101-103 (2006); jOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY 
OF ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 1-7 ( 1991 ). 
183 . Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972) ("The State continues co respond that 
unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children .... ") . 
HeinOnline -- 56 UCLA L. Rev. 803 2008-2009
Constitutional Birthright 803 
where officials separated birth parents from their offspring, it is less clear from 
the historical record to what extent this entailed a refusal to confer legal parent 
status in the first place or rather a termination of that status after conferring it, 
and it is also unclear to what extent the state proactively severed connections 
between children and unfit parents, before those parents maltreated the children, 
rather than only after maltreatment. What is clear is that the practice of state 
intervention to separate children from birth parents considered unfit dates back 
at least to the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which colonists imported to America.184 
The Elizabethan Poor Laws ascribed unfitness principally on the basis of 
birth parents being among the "idle poor," and the state's motivation for 
taking custody of children in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was more 
often to protect society from the breeding of more idle poor and criminals rather 
than to effectuate a moral right of children. 185 There was little appreciation 
before the nineteenth century of a child's personhood or of how children might 
be harmed by parental violence. However, there were also interventions to 
prevent "cruelty,"186 and colonists did believe children were entitled to be free 
from excessive abuse or neglect. 187 Local officials were quite intrusive in family 
matters by today's standards, and their authority to intervene to prevent abuse of 
children was widely accepted. 188 
During the nineteenth century, practices and attitudes began to evolve 
toward what we know today, in large part due to social life becoming less 
communal and more family~based, larger cities forming, and psychology emerging 
as a field of scientific study. 189 Beginning in the 1820s, states explicitly began to 
authorize removal of children from family settings deemed unsuited to a decent 
upbringing, and their subsequent placement in almshouses and orphanages.190 
Parental unfitness was still mostly tied to poverty and personal attributes 
184. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 11-12; CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACriCE, supra note 
181, at 118-22. As such, there is stronger evidence of a tradition of recognizing a somewhat more 
generally articulated right of children to avoid being in a legal relationship with unfit birth parents. 
But there clearly has been a tradition of denying legal parent status in the first instance to some birth 
parents deemed unfit (at a minimum, unwed fathers), and that might be sufficient for the Court to 
recognize a right of children at the level of specificity I have used. 
185 . CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACfiCE, supra note 181, at 118-21. 
186. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 12-13. 
187. See HAWES, supra note 182, at 1-2. For example, the Massachusetts "Body of Liberties of 
1641," reprinted in A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY 
FROM 1630 TO 1686, at 51 (William H. Whitmore ed., Rockwell & Churchill 1890), proscribed 
"unnaturall severitie" toward one's children in the "Liberties of Children" section and gave children 
"free libertie to complaine to the Authoritie for redresse." I d. at 5. 
188. ld . at 2, (r7; LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECT, AND 
ABUSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1997) . 
189. See ASHBY, supra note 188, at 51. 
190. CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACfiCE, supra note 181, at 124-26. 
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assumed to coincide with poverty, which would usually be apparent at the 
time of a child's birth and which could have led to separation of children 
from birth parents before any maltreatment occurred. Increasingly there was 
talk of saving children from unsuitable birth parents as a matter of children's 
moral right and of a corresponding duty on the part of public officials to 
prevent neglect of and cruelty toward children.191 Courts upheld such removal 
laws as part of the state's legitimate parens patriae authority, as the ultimate 
parent of society's children, viewing birth parents' custodial status as just a 
state-conferred privilege.192 A Pennsylvania court in 1839 explained that when 
parents "are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent the public from 
withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously are, at its sufferance?"193 
Recognition of the personhood of children and their moral right to be 
spared from parental cruelty and deprivation truly became widespread in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, particularly after the emergence of an 
awareness that children could be harmed by physical brutality.194 The first 
child protection agency began operations in 1874 in New York City, and by 
the end of the nineteenth century there were over 160 "societies" for the 
prevention of "cruelty" to children.195 These agencies, though private, exercised 
legal authority to remove children from birth parents deemed unfit, even 
at birth, and judgments of parental unfitness now rested principally on actual 
incapacities to provide proper care for children, such as chronic drunkenness 
or on grounds that parents had abused or neglected a child, rather than on 
them simply being "idle poor."196 In the early 1900s, these agencies were 
consciously limiting removal to the children whose birth parents more seriously 
imperiled the children's welfare and who were deemed incapable of reform, 
taking a social work approach with the less serious cases and offering assistance 
to parents thought capable of overcoming problems.197 During this Progressive 
191. Id. at 116, 128, 133; MYERS, supra note 182, at 13, 19. 
192. See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRAcriCE, supra note 181, at 126-28. 
193. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839) (per curiam); see also CHILD WELFARE LAW 
AND PRACfiCE, supra note 181, at 127 ("[l)n a series of cases involving delinquent and dependent 
children ... courts adopted the Crouse policy that the state's parens parriae duty and authority 
permitted seemingly unlimited intervention into family autonomy."). 
194. See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACfiCE, supra note 181, at 128-32; MYERS, supra note 
182, at 34-37, 44, 58; jANE WALDFCXJEL, THE FLITURE OF CHILD PROTECfiON 71, 78 (1998) 
("Protecting children as an end in itself has been an explicit goal for more than a century."); Hong, supra 
note 5, at 14-25. 
195. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 34-35, 37; CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACfiCE, supra 
note 181, at 132; WALDFOGEL, supra note 194, at 71. See generally MYERS, supra note 182, at 37-41. 
196. See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRAcriCE, supra note 181, at 132; MYERS, supra note 
182, at 35-36, 44-45; WALDFCXJEL, supra note 194, at 71-72. 
197. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 39-40, 48. 
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Era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states also created 
juvenile courts to adjudicate charges of parental unfitness and child 
maltreatment and reposed in them the power to order removal of children 
and termination of parental rights.198 State laws creating those courts included 
among conditions justifying separation of children from birth parents the 
parents' maintenance of an "unfit" home and "vicious" treatment of children.199 
That parent-child ties could be severed based on a judgment of parental 
incapacity or of an unfit home environment suggests that the law effectively 
attributed to children a right to avoid a relationship that presented a high 
risk of harm, without having to wait until maltreatment actually occurred. 
Indicative of a more general belief in children's right to a humane 
upbringing, in the early twentieth century states also enacted child labor laws 
and compulsory education laws, which also constrained parental choices and 
conduct, as well as public welfare programs targeted at children and struggling 
single mothers.200 Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government 
played an expanding role in child welfare. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
parens patriae authority of states to intervene in family life to protect children 
in a series of decisions beginning in the 1920s, most significantly by upholding a 
child labor-related ordinance in the 1944 case of Prince v. Massachusetts. 201 In 
several decisions after World War II, the Court firmly established the constitu-
tional personhood and rights-bearing status of children, decisions that 
transformed public education, juvenile delinquency practice, and other 
aspects of children's lives in which the state played a significant role. 202 
The second half of the twentieth century was also marked by expanding 
Congressional efforts to push states to be more responsive to child endangerment 
and maltreatment, motivated in large part by new child development 
research, studies revealing that physical abuse-of babies, in particular-was 
much more prevalent than had been supposed, and advocacy growing out of 
the civil rights movement for recognition of children's rights.203 Beginning in 
1980, Congress encouraged achieving permanent family situations for 
198. Seeid. at 64-67, 69; CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 181, at 114-15, 133--34. 
199. See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 181, at 133. 
200. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 54-55,60--61,64. 
201. 321 U.S. 158, 162, 166, 170 (1944) (upholding the conviction of a guardian for allowing 
a child to distribute religious tracts in the streets at night, stating that "the state as parens patriae may 
restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's 
labor, and in many other ways," and citing numerous prior decisions). 
202. See HAWES, supra note 182, at 96-97, 105--{)9. 
203. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 81-103; CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 181, 
at 136-37; WALDFOGEL, supra note 194, at 72; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,571-72 (2003) 
(suggesting that looking back just a half century could suffice in the search for a relevant tradition). 
HeinOnline -- 56 UCLA L. Rev. 806 2008-2009
806 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 755 (2009) 
maltreated children as early as possible, as recognition grew of the vital 
importance of positive early childhood experience and continuity of parental 
care to healthy development.204 Since the mid-90s, Congress has pushed 
child protection agencies to identify unfit parents and terminate their rights 
before they abuse or neglect children, based on a belief that children have a 
right to receive such preventive protection.205 
This brief historical account reveals that the state practice of keeping 
children out of legal relationships with and custody of unfit birth parents is 
centuries old in this country, that since at least the nineteenth century this 
practice has been widely understood to effectuate a moral right of 
children, and that to some degree this practice has entailed denying legal 
parent status in the first instance to birth parents deemed unfit. The 
conceptual understanding of "unfitness" and the typical alternatives to birth 
parents (principally adoptive parents) are different today from what they were 
originally (principally orphanages), but developing attitudes and scientific 
research have continually pushed the state toward denying legal parent 
status to birth parents who pose real dangers to children's basic welfare, even 
before the birth parer.~.ts have an opportunity to maltreat the children, and 
toward placing children in nurturing alternative family settings at the earliest 
possible time. 
On the whole, the historical record does support a finding that a right of 
newborn children not to be placed into relationships with unfit parents is deeply 
rooted in this country's traditions, much more clearly than the historical 
record presented in Lawrence supported a right to sexual freedom for 
homosexuals.206 Certainly there is no evidence of society explicitly rejecting 
this right of children, as there is with society rejecting the right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy and with society rejecting the right to abortion. 207 
204. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 74, 91, 100; CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 181, at 137-38. 
205. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 435-41. 
206. At times the Lawrence Coun aniculated the right at stake as the broader right to personal 
autonomy. See, e.g., 539 U.S. at 573-74. And the Coun did not rest its decision entirely on a 
history-and-tradition inquiry. But the Coun also assened the more specific "right of homosexual 
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct," id. at 560, and it did spend a significant ponion of 
its analysis examining the historical record of the criminal law's treatment of sodomy, id. at 568-70. 
207. See WALDFOGEL, supra note 194, at 72 ('Tnhe proposition that children should not be abused 
or neglected is not a controversial one."); cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 ( 1989) 
(plurality opinion) (stating that, for purposes of due process, an interest denominated as a "libeny" 
must be, inter alia, an interest "traditionally protected" by our society and that "[t]he protection need 
not take the form of an explicit constitutional provision or statutory guarantee, but it must at least 
exclude ... a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest"); id. at 127-28 n.6 (stating "[i]f, 
for example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural father of 
a child adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions 
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There have never been laws proscribing interference with unfit birth parents' 
relationships with their offspring, and consigning babies to unfit parents has 
never been a matter of moral principle, the way prohibition of sodomy has been. 
At worst, there has been state indifference to the plight of some children. 
The historical record more robustly supports a finding that a somewhat 
more broadly characterized right is rooted in our traditions--namely, a right of 
children not to be in a legal relationship with unfit parents (which might be 
effectuated by denying legal parent status in the first instance or by removing 
it after conferral). And an advocate for a newborn child could mount an 
as-applied challenge to a state's parentage laws on the basis of that broader 
right. But there is significant support in the historical record for recognizing 
the more specific right that I have formulated. 
In light of this history, one might wonder why the state today does 
continue to confer parenthood on unfit parents. The explanation likely lies 
in some combination of the following: Children's rights, while easy to espouse, 
are also easy to ignore and somewhat costly in the short term to effectuate.208 At 
least since the civil rights era, liberals have been very sympathetic to poor and 
minority race adults and highly sensitive to government measures that adversely 
affect them. Warren Court equal protection and privacy decisions further 
encouraged such sympathy and sensitivity. Thus, poverty law groups and 
civil rights groups often oppose legislation that would lead to greater child 
protective intervention.209 In addition, many people simply do not care what 
happens to other people's children. 
regarding natural fathers in general" and noting that the Coun's prior decisions recognizing a right to 
purchase and use contraceptives had not found any "longstanding and still extant societal tradition 
withholding the very right pronounced to be the subject of a libeny interest"). 
208. Cf. HAWES, supra note 182, at 109-13 (discussing difficulties in enforcing children's 
rights and child welfare laws); MYERS, supra note 182, at 72-73, 79-80 (noting that progress toward 
comprehensive and properly tailored child protection effons were derailed for much of the twentieth 
century by the Great Depression, World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War). 
209. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Supponing Plaintiffs-Appellees Subclass a and 
Supponing Affirmance, Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 Fed. App'x 313 (2nd Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-7079 (L) 02-
7119,02-7329,02-7419,02-7086,02-7412,02-7088, 02-7414), 2002 WL32903156 (C.A.2) (opposing a New 
York City policy of removing children from the custody of domestic violence victims, based on the policy's 
impact on women's equality); Dwyer, supra note 2 at 470-75 (discussing scholarly arguments against child 
welfare policies that have a disparate adverse impact on poor and minority race parents); ACLU Submits Brief 
in Texas FLDS Case Saying State Can't Separate Families Based Solely on Beliefs (May 29, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/religion/gen/ 35468prs20080529.html; High Coun Weighs Government Right 
to Interfere With Parents' Child Rearing Decisions Oan. 12, 2000), http://www.aclu.org/womensrigh~ 
parenting/13229prs20000112.html; ACLU Nebraska Legal Program-Religious Liberty, 
http://www.aclunebraska.org/ religious_libeny.htm (discussing the ACLU's opposition to State law requiring 
metabolic screening of all newborns). 
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Further, legislators absorb new social scientific knowledge rather slowly, 
and child maltreatment and early child development have not been subjects 
of robust research for very long.210 Only recently have legislators come to 
understand the vital importance for babies of attachment, bonding, and freedom 
from trauma and, correspondingly, the seriously adverse effects on infants of 
both indifferent or abusive parenting and foster care.211 When legislators do 
authorize child protection agencies and courts to take more proactive measures, 
social workers and judges do not fully use them, because both actors sympathize 
with parents and because social workers are trained to fix dysfunctional 
people rather than to make sound permanency decisions for children.212 Faith 
in the possibility and power of redemption is widespread, and few people are 
aware of the dismal statistics on parental rehabilitation outcomes.m 
Significantly, the explanations do not include a widespread belief that unfit 
birth parents are entitled to raise their offspring. At most there is a belief, 
primarily among liberals, that the state owes struggling parents assistance in 
becoming fit so long as that does not entail sacrificing the welfare of children, 
coupled with an unawareness of or reluctance to admit the damage instability 
can have on an infant.214 
In any event, it should be unnecessary to mount a historical case that 
western society has long recognized "a right of babies against the state placing 
them into relationships with unfit parents," or even the broader "right of 
children not to be in relationships with unfit parents," because articulating the 
right at a level of specificity that entails reference to a persons' age violates 
the second principle set forth above. Newborn babies' interest in the state 
not forcing them into a harmful parent-child relationship is one instance of a 
more general interest every person has in not being forced to enter into intimate 
relationships harmful to them, and there is no rational basis for thinking 
newborn babies have that interest to a lesser extent than do other people or 
are less morally deserving of its protection. Babies have an interest at least as 
strong as that of adult women in not being compelled to live with someone 
who is likely to cause them bodily harm or be indifferent to their well-being. 
Certainly a fundamental right against the state forcing one to be in a legal 
relationship and intimate association likely to be quite harmful is a right 
deeply rooted in our history as a free society and our tradition of limited 
government. Part II above showed that laws relating to marriage and to the 
210. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 89. 
211. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 452-57. 
212. See MYERS, supra note 182, at 219-20; Dwyer, supra note 2, at 452-57. 
213. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 431-32. 
214. See id. at 452-56. 
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formation of guardian-ward relationships reflect such a right. To deny newborn 
children this right by insisting on a much more specific right-description, one 
containing reference to their stage of life and the particular type of relationship 
that would harm them, would be arbitrary and morally unjustifiable. 
This somewhat more general articulation of the right so that it is one 
newborn children share with older persons, competent and incompetent, is 
more specific than others the Supreme Court has recognized as fundamental 
in substantive due process analysis, such as a right to make "'personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, 
child rearing, and education,"'215 "the right to make certain decisions regarding 
sexual conduct,"216 and "the right of a woman to make certain fundamental 
decisions affecting her destiny."217 It is limited to instances in which the state 
directly and profoundly impacts intimate associations, and to a type of 
situation in which actions of the political branches of government must be 
subject to judicial review in order to protect the basic welfare of citizens. It is 
a long-established, if rarely invoked, basic right that simply needs to be applied 
in a way that might seem novel but that is in fact consistent with centuries-old 
practices and attitudes. 
2. Grounding a Newborn's Right in Reasoned Judgment 
This alternative approach to identifying fundamental rights for substantive 
due process protection makes more sense as a linguistic matter, because it 
looks to the importance of the interests at stake, tying rights to protection of 
the most basic and important interests. Several members of the Supreme Court 
have over time endorsed Justice Harlan's statement in Poe v. Ullman218 : 
This 'liberty' ... is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, 
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints ... and which also recognizes, what a reasonable 
and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly 
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment. 219 
215. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997) (citing Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992)). 
216. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). 
217. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
218. 367 u.s. 497 (1963). 
219. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (opinion dissenting from dismissal 
on jurisdictional grounds), cited favorably in Casey, 505 U.S. at 848; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 
417, 446 (1990) (opinion of Stevens, J., announcing judgment of the Court); Moore v. City of E. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484 (1965). 
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This approach to defining fundamental interests and rights often comes under 
attack for inviting unconstrained, subjective, value-laden judgments by 
judges.220 However, an interest's importance in welfare terms is in principle 
susceptible to scientific demonstration; courts can look to empirical evidence 
of how much people suffer when a given interest is thwarted. An interest's 
importance in metaphysical terms might be substantiated by examining the 
extent to which political majorities or elites endeavor to secure it for themselves 
legislatively, which might be implicit in existing law or explicit in documents 
and statements issued in support of existing laws or practices. Such contempo-
rary social scientific investigations might be more objective and reliable than 
the historical investigation prescribed by the tradition-based approach. 
Under this second approach, it would be difficult to find many better 
candidates for a fundamental right than the right of a baby not to be placed 
into a legal relationship and compelled intimate association with unfit 
parents. Apart from executions, there might be nothing more damaging that the 
state does to people. As noted above, the parenting children receive, especially 
in the first year of life, has an enormous impact on their fate in life. Even 
more than physical harm, being deprived of consistent and attentive nurturance 
in a stable environment during infancy typically produces seriously adverse life-long 
consequences. 221 State statutes or court decisions causing some children to 
experience such deprivation clearly impact the children's fundamental interests. 
This is so whether the state is placing children with biological parents through 
parentage laws or with nonbiological parents through adoption laws. 
The Court has often cautioned that the state must tread especially 
carefully when its actions impact intimate family relationships, and has 
indicated that the primary reason family relationships receive constitutional 
protection is that they typically provide positive emotional attachments, which 
are the basis of identity, self-worth, and happiness.222 This supports the 
conclusion that every person has a right against the state denying them an 
opportunity to form such positive emotional attachments, especially at the outset 
of life. Persons' early relational experience with parents likely has a greater 
220. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 153, at 111-13. 
221. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 415-28. 
222. See, e.g., RobertS v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) ("!nhe constitutional shelter 
afforded [highly personal] relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others .... The personal affiliations that exemplify these 
considerations ... are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family."); Smith v. Org. 
of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977); Moore, 431 
U.S. at 503-D5. 
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impact on emotional development, identity formation, sense of self, and 
happiness than do their relationships as adults.223 
In addition to the scientifically documented adverse welfare effects of 
child maltreatment, unfit parents thwart children's development of autonomy, 
which Supreme Court decisions in several contexts have treated as central 
to human flourishing.224 The Court has also been more inclined to recognize 
substantive due process rights against state action that threatens substantially 
to undermine a person's life prospects. For example, the Court has rested the 
right to an abortion in large part on the connection between women's ability 
to control their reproductive lives and their "ability to realize their full 
potential."225 Again, apart from killing a person, there is not much a state can 
do that more undermines persons' life prospects than consigning them at the 
outset of life to the custody of adults who abuse or neglect them, or depriving 
them of healthy attachment with permanent caregivers by depositing them 
into the troubled foster care system. Any theory of rights predicated upon the 
importance of interests would therefore have to attribute to babies a fundamen-
tal right against the state making them the legal children of unfit parents. 
C. State Justifications for Infringing the Right 
If babies have a fundamental substantive due process right against the 
state placing them in family relationships with unfit parents, then a challenge 
to maternity and paternity laws as applied to a newborn whose birth parents 
are manifestly unfit would put the state in the position of having to show that 
such laws, without exceptions for unfitness, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest. The state would need to demonstrate that placing 
newborn babies int~ legal and custodial relationships with birth parents without 
regard to fitness is necessary to avoid some other great and overriding cost. 
223. On the lifelong impact of early childhood experience, see Dwyer, supra note 2, at 415-30. 
224. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) ("[L]egal challenges to undue 
restrictions on abortion procedures ... center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, 
and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); Roberts, 
468 U.S. at 619 (noting that constitutional protection of intimate relationships "safeguards the 
ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty"); }AMES G. 
DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 140--60 (2006) (discussing the impact of 
children's family life on their development of autonomy). 
225. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) ("As Casey comprehended, at stake 
in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman's 'control over her [own] destiny."' (quoting 
Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,869 (1992) (plurality opinion))). 
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Importantly, avoiding additional administrative costs would not 
be sufficient justification.226 Even if it were, the reality is that there would be 
little additional administrative burden from identifying presumptively 
unfit parents at the time of birth rather than after they have damaged a 
child. To identify birth parents presumptively unfit by virtue of past 
conduct, state-level child protection agencies need simply install a computer 
program that cross-checks databases the state already possesses--namely, 
birth records and records of past child maltreatment or violent felonies. To 
identify birth parents presumptively unfit by virtue of current substance 
abuse, states need only mandate testing of all newborns for drug or alcohol 
exposure, which some hospitals already routinely do. States already require 
birthing facilities that do test newborns to report positive drug toxicology results 
to the local child protective agency and could easily expand that mandate to 
include alcohol as well. Any court proceeding triggered by such identification, 
aimed at preventing assignment of children at birth to unfit parents (or, when 
likely to be effective quickly, providing services to rehabilitate the parents), 
would likely substitute for and obviate the need for the several court proceedings 
that ordinarily ensue after unfit parents maltreat children. Prevention would 
be much easier and cheaper for the state than would remediation. 
A truly compelling state interest might be avoiding substantial and 
unwarranted injury to society generally or to other individuals. Given the 
enormous social cost of child maltreatment, and given that the state already 
severs many children's legal relationship with unfit parents (though only after 
maltreatment occurs), it would be implausible to suggest that limited pre-
parentage screening aimed at preventing child maltreatment would on the whole 
harm societal interests. Rather, the most obvious candidate for a compelling 
state interest is avoiding the impact on biological parents who wish to be 
the legal parents of their offspring but are denied their wish because they are 
unfit. In this subpart, I therefore focus principally on the competing claim of 
biological parents. 
1. Birth Parents' Constitutional Right to Be Legal Parents 
Many people speak as if there is a well-recognized constitutional right of 
biological parents per se to become legal parents. In reality, the U.S. 
Constitution contains not a word about parenthood, and the Supreme Court 
226. Cf. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974) (stating that "[t]he 
conservation of the taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational 
residence requirement" on use of the county's hospital, because the requirement "severely penalizes 
exercise of the right to freely migrate and settle in another State"). 
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has never held that there is such a right. In fact, as discussed below, the Court has 
implied that unfit parents have no such right. This subsection explains why 
the notion of an unfit birth parent having a right to be the legal parent of an 
offspring has no basis in constitutional doctrine, morality, or natural law. 
a. Doctrine 
The Court has recognized a right to "be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child,"m but only in the contexts of prohibitions 
on contraception or abortion and of forced sterilization, which all have to do 
with procreation rather than status as a legal parent. One might think it 
follows naturally from a right to procreate that one has a right to raise the 
child created, but the two activities are distinct: the former does not 
logically entail the latter, and the Court has never held that the latter follows 
from or is contained within the former as a matter of constitutionallaw.228 
The Court has also at times pronounced a "fundamental right of parents 
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,"229 
but only in the contexts of state regulation of child-rearing choices and 
proceedings to terminate parental rights, after biological parents have already 
been in a legal and social relationship with a child.llO In addition, to the extent 
227. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)); see also 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536-37, 541 (1942) (striking down legislation which provided 
for the sterilization of "habitual criminal[s)"; strict scrutiny applies to sterilization laws because they 
involve procreation, "one of the basic civil rights of man"). While the notion of a right to have sex 
without creating a baby is entirely plausible as a moral matter, the notion of a moral right to create 
another human being while having sex is quite suspect. Rights, in their origin and in prevailing 
contemporary usage, protect individuals' personal integrity and self-determination, not their desires 
as to the existence or life course of other persons. See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and 
Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1405-23 (1994). 
Nevertheless, I take for granted in this Article that adults have a constitutionally-protected right of 
some scope to procreate. Its scope as a matter of positive law is uncertain; the Supreme Court upheld 
involuntary sterilization of"feeble-minded" persons in state institutions in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 
205-08 (1927), but has not had occasion in recent decades to decide whether that decision is still 
good law. 
228. Indeed the Court has noted the obvious fact that biological parenthood is not identical 
with social or legal parenthood. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) ("[T)he mere 
existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."); cf. Smith v. Org. 
of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816,843 (1977) (noting that "biological 
relationships are not exclusive determination of the existence of a family"). 
229. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
230. Id. at 65-67 (plurality opinion) (citing precedents); cf. id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("A parent's rights with respect to her child ... are limited by the existence of an actual, developed 
relationship with a child, and are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family."). 
In its most recent decision involving parents' child rearing rights, the Court implicitly treated them 
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the Court has offered any justification for attributing this unenumerated 
constitutional right to parents, it has principally been that parental authority 
over and continued relationship with children is conducive to the children's 
healthy development,m and its decisions upholding parental control rights have 
emphasized that the parents were fit and not endangering their children.232 
By implication, even the control rights the Court has recognized would not apply 
when parents are unfit or when they would operate to undermine children's 
healthy development. 
The most relevant Supreme Court precedents concern unwed biological 
fathers' substantive due process right to be legal parents. The Court established 
in four pre-Rehnquist Court decisions that constitutional protection attaches 
to a fit biological father's interest in legal paternity if and only if he "demon-
strates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child."m Biology alone does not give 
rise to a constitutional right to be a legal parent.234 In two of those cases, the 
as less than fundamental, applying a level of scrutiny less than strict. See David D. Meyer, The 
Constitutionality of"Bestlnterests" Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 875 (2006). 
231. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion) ("[H)istorically [the law) has recognized 
'that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."' (quoting 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979))); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,637-38 (1979) (plurality 
opinion) ("[T)he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on 
the freedoms of minors .... This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept 
and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("The duty [of parents] to prepare the child for 
'additional obligations' ... must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious 
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925))); id. at 233-34 ("To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, 
may be subject to limitation ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or 
safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."); id. at 535 ("!nhose who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations."). 
232. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 ("mhe Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, 
that Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presump-
tion that fir parents act in the best interests of their children .... Accordingly, so long as a parent 
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fir), there will normally be no reason for the Stare to 
inject itself into the private realm of the family .... "); id. at 60-61,69-70, 72 (plurality opinion) (finding 
that the lower court failed ro accord appropriate weight to a fit parent's determination to limit her 
children's visitation with their grandparents); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230 ("This case, of course, is not 
one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, 
order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 400 ( 1923) ("Mere knowledge of rhe German language cannot reasonably be regarded 
as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable .... His right thus 
to reach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the 
liberty of the Amendment."); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Washington 
lacks even a legitimate governmental interest ... in second-guessing a fit parent's decision .... "). 
233. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. 
234. See Meyer, supra note 230, at 870-72. 
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Court held that the biological father had no constitutional right to prevent 
another man from becoming the legal father of his offspring, because he had 
not demonstrated a commitment.235 Importantly, as with the parental control 
cases, in none of these unwed fathers' rights cases was there an allegation 
that the adult asserting rights was unfit to be a parent, and the Court 
implied that unfitness would be a proper basis for denying the right.236 This is an 
aspect of the unwed father cases that family law scholars have overlooked. 
In Stanley v. Illirwis, 237 the Court in fact suggested that the state could constitu-
tionally require a hearing on an unwed father's fitness prior to conferring on him 
legal parental status, and indeed could put the onus on the biological father to 
initiate the proceeding.238 
On the other hand, the Court also hinted that a state could not deny 
legal parenthood to a committed biological father absent an unfitness 
finding-in other words, that unfitness is a necessary as well as a sufficient condi-
tion for denying parentage to a biological father who assumes child rearing 
responsibilities. The Court stated in Qui/loin v. Walcott?39 
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended 
"[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, 
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some 
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought 
to be in the children's best interest."240 
This statement, however, is dictum. In addition, it presupposes the prior 
existence of family relationships that would be broken up, so is not pertinent 
to the parentage decision at the time of birth (the Court emphasized that the 
biological father in that case had never had custody of the child), and it 
actually suggests that the state is constitutionally forestalled from breaking up 
a family only if the child as well as the parent objects. 
In any event, it provides no support for the proposition that unfit biologi-
cal parents have a positive constitutional right to the state granting them legal 
parent status as to their offspring at the time of birth. Lower courts relying on 
the early fathers' rights cases have consistently indicated that unfitness 
235 . Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248,261-62, 266-67; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,254-56 (1978) . 
236. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1972) ("We do not question the 
assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from their children .... What is the state interest 
in separating children from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the futher is 
unfit in a particular case?"). 
237 . 405 u.s. 645. 
238. Id . at 656-57 & n.9, 658. 
239. 434 u.s. 246 (1978). 
240. Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 
U.S. 816, 862-63 ( 1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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obviates a biological parent's claim to a constitutional right to a relation-
ship.241 The Supreme Court suggested in the last of its early unwed father 
cases that biological parentage alone affords a man "an opportunity" to demon-
strate commitment to parenthood,241 but did so in dictum, without making 
clear whether it was referring to an opportunity conferred by state statue or 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Later courr decisions discussed below have 
rejected the notion that biology alone gives rise to any constitutional right of 
an unwed father. 
Courts might come to a different conclusion with respect to mothers, 
but cases have not arisen to test that possibility. The Supreme Court might 
well hold that pregnancy entails sacrifice sufficient to show commitment to paren-
tal responsibility, so that any fit birth mother per se has a constitutional right 
to become her offspring's legal parent. But there is no reason to suppose that the 
Court would hold that fitness is irrelevant with respect to mothers. In fact, 
constitutional norms of gender equality presumptively would require the Court 
to hold that unfit birth mothers, as much as unfit biological fathers, have no 
constitutional right to become legal parents and custodians of their offspring. 
Two doctrinal developments in more recent years further support a 
conclusion that birth parents deemed unfit by the state have no constitu-
tional right to be in a legal relationship with or to raise their offspring. One 
is the ascendancy of the history and tradition approach to identifying funda-
mental rights,243 given that the historical record of state parentage laws and child 
protection efforts described in the prior subsection reveals a clear and 
widespread rejection of such an entitlement.144 Under the reasoned judgment 
approach to identifying substantive due process rights as well, a claim to a 
constitutional right to be a parent despite unfitness would have little plausibility. 
While all humans might have a strong interest in being in family relationships 
241. See , e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992) (en bane); In re 
Kirchner, 649 N .E.2d 324, 334, 339 (Ill. 1995); In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 666-67 
(Mich. 1993); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418,424 (N.Y. 1990). 
242 . Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) ("The significance of the biological 
connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop 
a relationship with his offspring."). 
243. See Meyer, supra note 161, at 805--06 (noting that the "history and tradition" approach 
has been relied on especially in recent Supreme Court decisions); id. at 809 (characterizing the 
traditional-recognition test for substantive due process rights as "the Court's dominant methodology 
in the family-privacy context"). 
244. See Hong, supra note 5, at 14-24. The proper level of specification in the case of parents' 
rights would include reference to parents and unfitness, because it is clearly morally relevant, in a way 
that weakens the asserted claim, that the relationship is one of custody over a helpless and quite 
vulnerable person and that the individual asserting the right is known to present a danger to that 
helpless, vulnerable person. 
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that generate emotional, psychological, and physical goods, they do not have 
a strong interest in being in dysfunctional and destructive relationships 
that are likely to be disrupted. Additionally, it is not part of human flourishing 
to be in a parental role but fail miserably at it and damage one's child. 
Second, the Court's constitutional jurisprudence relating to the family 
has shifted emphasis somewhat from biological relationships to social 
relationships that generate emotional and psychological benefits for their 
members. In particular, the most recent Supreme Court decision analyzing a 
claim to a constitutional right to be a parent, Michael H. v. Gerald D.,145 
rejected such a claim by a biological parent who had an established rela-
tionship with the child in question, and upheld a California law that established 
an irrebuttable presumption of paternity in favor of a mother's husband.246 
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion explicitly denied that biology plus com-
mitment are sufficient to generate a constitutional right, concluding that 
the Court's precedents instead established constitutional protection for "the 
relationships that develop within the unitary family," not for biological rela-
tionships.247 The three dissenters in Michael H. would have applied the 
biology-plus-commitment test, but they also rejected the notion that biology 
alone gives rise to constitutional protection, stating that "although an unwed 
father's biological link to his child does not, in and of itself, guarantee him a 
constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link combined 
with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so."148 
Consistent with this emphasis on family relationship as social rather 
than merely biological or legal, courts have generally accorded less weight to 
an interest in initiating a relationship than to an interest in maintaining an 
already-established social family relationship.149 This has included courts being 
245. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
246. See id. at 113-17, 129. The four dissenters in that case-justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and White-are now all gone from the Court. Id . at 136, 157. 
247 . I d. at 123-24. Some lower courts nevertheless continue to apply the "biology plus" test 
established by the earlier unwed father cases. See, e.g., In reSt. Vincent's Servs., 841 N.Y.S.2d 834, 
848-852 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007). 
248. Michael H ., 491 U.S. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 143 n.2 ("[A] mere 
biological connection is in.sufficient to establish a liberty interest on the part of an unwed father."); 
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (stating 
that "the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, 
stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association" and noting 
that for a child who has never known his biological parents, a relation.ship with other caregivers 
"should hold the same place in the emotional life of the ... child, and fulfill the same socializing 
functions, as a natural family") ; id. at 845 n.53 ("The legal status of families has never been regarded 
as controlling .... "). 
249. See Meyer, supra note 230, at 878 (indicating that a birth parent's interest in becoming a 
legal parent might receive less constitutional protection than the interest of someone who has 
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less solicitous of the desires of adults--even biological parents-to enter into 
legal relationships with children than of adults' interest in maintaining a 
relationship with a child once they have been in one and formed attachments. 
For example, in 1998 the California Supreme Court rejected an unwed 
father's claim to constitutional guarantee of an opportunity to demonstrate 
commitment to parenthood-the sort of opportunity alluded to in Lehr v. 
Robertson250-joining other state courts in concluding from the plurality and 
dissenting opinions in Michael H. that "a biological father's mere desire to 
establish a personal relationship with the child is not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause."251 
With adults who are not biological parents, there are many more 
examples of courts differentiating continuation of an existing relationship from 
a desire to initiate a relationship. One is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mullins 
v. Oregon/52 rejecting a biological grandmother's claim to a constitutional 
right to priority in adopting the children of her son, whose parental rights were 
involuntarily terminated.253 The court emphasized that "this is not a case about 
breaking up an extant family unit ... [as] there never has been any familial 
relationship," but rather about "creating a new family unit where none existed 
before."254 The court held that an interest "in a potential, still undeveloped 
familial relationship ... does not rise to the level of a fundamental liberty 
interest."255 Significantly, the court observed that a claim to state conferral 
of parental status is a claim to a positive right, rather than to the sort of 
already served for a time as a child's legal parent {whether a biological parent or an adoptive parent) 
in remaining in that role); David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right w Public Recognition of Family 
Relationships? The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 VILL. L. REv. 891, 891-95 (2006) (showing 
that as a general matter the Supreme Court has interpreted the privacy right to protect already 
existing familiar relationships from government interference and not as a right to state's affirmative 
assistance in forming relationships). 
250. 463 u.s. 248 (1983). 
251. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Cal. 1998); see also Lisa I. v. 
Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 927, 937 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]hen there is no existing relationship 
between the claimed biological father and the child, courts must defer to legislative choices reflected 
in paternity statutes."); Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 188 {Iowa 1999) (citing decisions in 
numerous other states refusing to recognize a due process right on the basis of biological fatherhood) . 
Some state courts have held that biological fathers per se have a protected liberty interest under state 
constitutions. See id. at 187-90 (concluding that there is such a right under Iowa's state constitution 
and citing similar decisions in Colorado and Texas). 
252. 57 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1995). 
253 . Id. at 791. 
254. Id. at 793-94. 
255. Id . at 794. The court distinguished Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), 
on the grounds that "Moore was a case about breaking up an existing family unit, not a case about 
creating an entirely new one." Mullins, 57 F.3d at 794. 
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"negative right to be free of governmental interference" that the Constitution 
more dearly confers.256 
In addition to denying biological fathers per se constitutional protection 
of their interest in being legal and social parents to their offspring, the 
Supreme Court has as a constitutional matter declined to require states to 
apply any particular substantive legal standard of parental fitness when they 
sever such a relationship, even after a legal parent-child relationship exists 
with a mother or father. The Court has established a constitutional right 
of legal parents to certain procedural protections in connection with termi-
nation of parental rights proceedings-namely, that the state must prove by 
dear and convincing evidence that a parent meets the state's unfitness standard, 
whatever that standard happens to be, and that in some cases the court must 
supply a lawyer for indigent parents.257 But the Court has never indicated 
that the state must find misconduct of a particular kind or severity in order 
to sever such a relationship. This further undermines any attempt by a state to 
justify infringing newborns' due process rights relating to legal parentage on 
the grounds that it is respecting birth parents' constitutional rights. 
In sum, a state would not infringe any established constitutional right of 
biological parents by changing its parentage statutes to exclude unfit biological 
parents from legal parenthood, at least so long as birth parents have opportunity 
for a hearing on their fitness and adequate assistance in presenting their case, 
including state-funded legal representation if they are poor. If a biological 
parent asserted a right to become a child's legal parent regardless of fitness, 
there is ample basis in the Supreme Court's prior decisions for assuming the 
Court would reject such a claim. And even if the Court did conclude that 
some constitutional right exists for biological parents per se with respect to legal 
parentage, its statement in numerous contexts that protecting the welfare of 
children is a compelling state interest suggests that it would find no 
violation of such a right in a state excluding from legal parenthood birth 
parents whom the state has good reason to suppose will seriously damage 
a child. 258 Significantly, lower courts have uniformly rejected constitutional 
256. Mullins , 57 FJd at 794; see also id . at 796. 
257 . See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (applying a clear and convincing 
evidence standard); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (noting the right to an 
appointed attorney). 
258. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) ("The State has a strong and 
legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens."); l..assirer, 452 U.S. at 27 (1981) ("!nhe State 
has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child . .. . "); Zablocki v. Redhail , 434 U.S. 374, 388 
(1978) (accepting for the sake of analysis that protecting the welfare of children is a "substantial 
interest[]"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (describing ways in which, 
"[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the 
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challenges to state laws that authorize TPR on the basis of a parent's prior 
TPR as to another child.259 The Indiana Supreme Court explained that such 
a provision 
is narrowly tailored to include only those parents who have had at least 
one chance to reunify with a different child through the aid of 
governmental resources and have failed to do so. As the California 
Court of Appeals has pointed out, "[e]xperience has shown that with 
certain parents ... the risk of recidivism is a very real concern. 
Therefore, when another child of that same parent is adjudged a 
dependent child, it is not unreasonable to assume that reunification 
efforts will be unsuccessful."260 
b. The Moral Basis for State Creation of Families 
When the state decides who will be a child's legal and custodial parents, 
it acts in a special role in which it should be unconstrained by, and in fact 
should not defer to, alleged rights of other private parties. The sole moral 
justification for the state getting involved in such a quintessentially private 
decision as who someone's family members will be is that the person is unable 
to make that decision for herself. The state has for many centuries assumed 
responsibility for acting on behalf of such persons, as a proxy, pursuant to a 
parens patriae power and obligation.261 And if the only justification for the state 
presuming to step into the lives of private parties and make choices about 
parent's control"). Lower couns have said this many times as well. See, e.g., In re Sheneal W. Jr., 
728 A.2d 544, 552 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) ("[l]t is beyond debate that the state has a compelling 
interest in protecting children."); G.B. v. Dearborn County Div. of Family and Children, 754 N.E.2d 
1027, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("(11he state has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of 
children."); In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2002) (referring to "the State's compelling 
interests in identifying parents who pose a risk to the safety and well being of their children and 
providing such children with the nurturing care and treatment they have a right to expect"). 
259. See, e.g., In re Custody and Parental Rights of A.P., 172 P.3d 105 (Mont. 2007); Renee J. 
v. Superior Coun, 28 P.3d 876, 878, 886 (Cal. 2001); In re Baby Boy H., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 796, 
799 (Ct. App. 1998); G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1030-32; State ex rei. Children, Youth & Families 
Dep't v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); cf. Sheneal W. ]r., 728 A.2d at 546, 552 
(holding that the retroactive application of a statute providing for termination of parental rights 
when a parent has intentionally assaulted another child of the parent did not violate the parent's 
due process rights); Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Darrell A., 534 N.W.2d 907, 909-10 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the termination of parental rights pursuant to a statute making 
intentional homicide of parent grounds for termination did nor constitute ex post facto law, did not 
violate the father's due process or equal protection rights, and did not constitute double jeopardy). 
260. G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1032. 
261. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring 
to "the State's long-recognized interests as parens patriae and, critically, the child's own 
complimentary interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and protection" and citing 
several Coun precedents). 
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their intimate relationships is that the private parties are incapable of self-
determination and need decisions to be made for them, the state's authority 
to make such decisions should extend no fur.ther than doing for the private 
parties what they would do for themselves if able. 
Thus, the usual police power justifications for state action-namely, 
furthering the common good or protecting rights of other individuals262--should 
be viewed as inapposite in this context. The state certainly could not invoke 
its police power to select spouses for competent adults. It could not compel 
one adult to marry another, on the grounds that, by refusing to marry, the former 
is making the latter intensely unhappy, or on the grounds that the latter has 
a fundamental right to marry, or on the grounds that compelling them into 
marriage would serve some broad societal purpose. Likewise, the state cannot 
legitimately invoke its police power to decide who a child's parents will be and 
thereby base its decisions on a balancing of the child's welfare against the 
desires or interests of the birth parents or against the interests of the rest of 
society. The parens patriae power, not the police power, is the sole appropriate 
basis for the state making such a decision about a person's life. 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children 
and Family Services,263 manifested agreement with this view in the context of 
adoption. The court explained that the State of Florida, in selecting adoptive 
parents for children, was acting not in a police power role, but rather acting 
in a parens patriae role as a surrogate for the child, making for the child a kind 
of decision private parties usually make on their own without state involvement, 
but that someone must make on behalf of a child because of the child's 
incapacity. The court went on to state that in that special, proxy role, the 
state is not constitutionally constrained in the same ways or to the same 
degree as it is when it is regulating the conduct of or mediating disputes between 
autonomous persons.264 In particular, the court intimated that private parties 
other than the child (in that case, adult applicants for adoption) have less 
constitutional basis for objecting to what the state does than they might in 
another context, such as distribution of welfare benefits, in which the state 
acts in a police power role. 
The best explanation for this view is that when the state acts merely as 
proxy or agent for a private parry, making a decision ordinarily within the realm 
262. See Brown, supra note 150, at 42 ("[nhe Constitution has required legislatures, when 
seeking tO restrict imponanr libenies of their people, to provide reasons that relate to .the demands of 
organized society, generally referred to as the police power."). 
263 . 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
264. /d . at 809-10 ("Because of the primacy of the welfare of the child, the state can make 
classifications for adoption purposes that would be constitutionally suspect in many other areas."). 
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of private life, its decisionmaking should replicate that of an autonomous 
private party making a similar decision. Assuming that autonomous persons 
ordinarily act, or at least are entitled to act, solely to further their own well 
being, the state's proxy decisionmaking should not entail sacrificing the interests 
of the nonautonomous person in order to serve the interests or desires of other 
parties. It should not entail even considering other's interests, and no rights 
should be attributed to other persons. No one has a legal or moral right to be 
chosen as a spouse, and likewise no one should be deemed to have a right to 
be chosen as a parent.265 Other adults have a right to decline a relationship 
with us, but no right to force us into one with them, regardless of how strongly 
they desire it, regardless of what connection they might feel to us, and regardless 
of what disparate societal impact our decision might have. Likewise, no one, not 
even biological parents, should be viewed as having a right to be in a parent-child 
relationship with a newborn child that constrains the state's surrogate 
decisionmaking on behalf of the child. 
This view-that when the state acts in a parens patriae role other private 
parties have no rights that constrain how the state carries out that role-finds 
expression in the law governing decisionmaking for incompetent adults. In 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,266 the Supreme Court rejected 
a suggestion by parents of an adult in a persistent vegetative state that they 
had a constitutional right to make the decision to terminate their daughter's 
life support. The Court stated that, regardless of how strongly the parents felt 
about the matter, only the incompetent adult herself had any constitutional 
rights in the matter that could properly be considered.267 As discussed in Part II, 
state laws governing appointment of guardians for incompetent adults also 
reflect this view. 
Thus, in establishing and applying parentage laws, the state should be 
seen as acting in a quasi-private parens patriae capacity, solely as an agent for 
the newborn child, driven by rights of the child but otherwise stepping outside 
of the Constitution.268 Biological parents should be viewed as not having 
constitutional rights relating to state parentage decisions any greater than 
they would have relating to another private party's self-determining 
265. For an extended argument in suppon of this proposition, see generally DwYER, supra note 
224, at 68-122. 
266. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). 
267. /d. at 266-67, 285--87 (1990); see also id. at 315-16 {Brennan, J., dissenting) {asserting 
that the state's only legitimate interest in connection with cessation of treatment was "a parens 
patriae interest in providing Nancy Cruzan, now incompetent, with as accurate as possible a 
determination of how she would exercise her rights under these circumstances"). 
268. For an extended explanation and defense of this idea of stepping outside the Constitution, 
see DwYER, supra note 224, at 188-203. 
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relationship decisions. Thus, they might have an equal protection-type right 
against a state that entirely and arbitrarily excludes them from consideration as 
potential legal parents, just as any adult would have a right against a state 
arbitrarily and categorically precluding them from ever becoming anyone's 
spouse. And if it is best for a newborn to be in a parent-child relationship 
with her biological parents, as it is in most cases, such that the state's surrogate 
choice of parents on behalf of the newborn should be in favor of the 
biological parents, then both the biological parents and the baby might be said 
to have a constitutional right against the state preventing them from forming 
a relationship. But courts should conclude that biological parents have no 
constitutional right to use state power to force their association on a child or 
to be in a relationship with a child even in the absence of a reciprocal, proxy 
choice, just as adults have no moral or legal right to state assistance in forcing 
their association on another adult against the latter's actual or surrogate choice. 
c. Natural Law 
Though existing constitutional doctrine and moral reasoning do not 
support attribution of a constitutional right to legal parenthood for biological 
parents per se, some might suppose that natural law does, and that the state, 
in its parentage laws, is simply recognizing and respecting the natural order 
of human life. Whether natural law thinking is at all coherent or plausible 
has been the subject of much philosophical debate. I will not rehearse or wade 
into that debate here, but rather will simply suggest that it could not justify 
infringing the right of newborns I have formulated. 
Defenders of the current practice of predicating parentage in the 
first instance on biology alone might contend that it is an aspect of human 
nature to care about one's biological offspring, more so than would other 
adults, and that natural law therefore dictates that biological parents should 
always raise their children. 
Anyone who believes that syllogism to be decisive, however, cannot 
have given it much thought. For the very problem I address is that a signifi-
cant percentage of adults are not disposed to care for their offspring, or even 
if disposed are incapable of doing so adequately. In many cases, birth parents 
demonstrate by conduct toward other children that their nature is actually 
to abuse their offspring. A natural law proponent ought to say that it violates 
natural law for parents to abuse or neglect their offspring and, if it is the 
state's place to enforce natural law, that the state should therefore act to 
keep offspring out of relationships with and custody of such birth parents. 
HeinOnline -- 56 UCLA L. Rev. 824 2008-2009
824 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 755 (2009) 
Further, observation of human behavior might reveal that there is 
something natural about biologically unrelated persons caring about and for 
vulnerable persons who do not have an adequate caregiver,269 and something 
quite unnatural about knowingly thrusting vulnerable persons into dangerous 
or grossly unhealthy situations, as we collectively do now through our parentage 
laws. It is not difficult to construct a natural law argument for effectuating 
our compassion toward helpless newborns through state laws ensuring that 
they enter into parent-child relationships only with adults who will give them a 
good childhood and prepare them for flourishing lives. Correspondingly, turning 
a blind eye to the danger unfit birth parents pose to babies is patently 
inconsistent with the nobler part of human nature. 
2. Parents' Interests 
Apart from any constitutional or natural law claim biological parents 
might have, there is the simple and undeniable fact that many biological 
parents who are denied legal parent status of their offspring will thereby 
experience a great sense of loss and emotional suffering. Not all will; a 
substantial percentage of parents in the child protective system manifest 
surprising indifference. 270 But many would suffer emotionally and psychologi-
cally. The state might defend infringing children's constitutional right 
against state-compelled harmful associations by asserting that existing law, 
making biological parents the legal parents of their offspring without regard to 
fitness but allowing for termination of that legal relationship after 
maltreatment occurs, is on the whole a scheme narrowly tailored to serving 
the state's compelling interest in avoiding such suffering on the part of birth 
parents. 271 There are several reasons why a court should reject this argument. 
First, the practical difference between the current regime and the one I 
propose is substantial for children but not for parents. The practical difference 
for children arises from the fact that states currently react to parental unfitness 
typically only after a child is harmed. When states do identify unfit parents at 
birth, they almost never seek immediate TPR and adoption even when legally 
269. See, e.g., jOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF 
CHILDREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE ( 1988). 
270. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at n.97. 
2 71. David Meyer argues, from a parents' rights standpoint, that the greater intensity of a birth 
parent's interest in becoming a legal parent, relative to, for example, a legal parent's interest in not 
having to allow a grandparent to visit a child, would lead courts to scrutinize relatively rigorously a 
parentage law that excluded some birth parents. Meyer, supra note 230, at 879 ("[nhe total loss of 
even an expectancy of a parent-child relationship remains a very substantial imposition on the 
individual, increasing the appropriate degree of scrutiny."). 
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they could, but rather either send the baby home with his or her unfit parents 
or place the baby in foster care. Further, current TPR rules do not cover many 
cases of parental unfitness.272 The typical result for children under the current 
regime is either maltreatment by parents or attachment problems because 
of delayed permanence, which in either case is likely to cause serious life-
1 h 273 ong arm. 
The benefit to unfit parents of the current regime, on the other hand, is 
slight or illusory compared to denying them legal parent status in the first 
instance. First, whatever psychological and emotional experience parents 
have as a result of being denied a relationship with their biological offspring 
does not affect fundamental interests in the way that damage to a baby does. 
The frequent assertion that biological parents have a fundamental interest in 
raising their offspring is empirically unsupportable. Raising a child is not 
something basic to everyone's welfare, as attested by the fact that many adults 
happily choose not to do it. Not everything that some people strongly desire 
is a fundamental interest. In contrast, receiving attentive, loving, competent 
nurturing in the first years of life is as fundamental and universal as human 
interests get, outdone perhaps only by the interest in simply remaining alive. 
Second, the difference for the parent between earlier or later termination 
of parental rights is not great. If a child is removed at birth and prospects for 
parental rehabilitation are slim, parents gain little by the state's efforts to 
reform them during a period when they have little or no contact with the 
baby. They will have a chance to try, but having had that chance and failed 
will not necessarily feel better than never having had the chance. If the child 
is instead sent home with them and incurs abuse or neglect, the parents 
might then be subject not only to civil maltreatment proceedings but also to 
criminal proceedings and incarceration. In addition, if they do in fact care 
about their offspring, they will likely experience the suffering of knowing that 
they damaged the child. Opponents of child welfare interventions often 
suppose simplistically that all parents are always better off having custody of 
their offspring rather than not, but that ignores the real costs to parents of the 
state putting them in a position to damage their offspring and also ignores, on 
the other hand, the consolation birth parents can experience if the child they 
create is adopted before being damaged and goes on to live a healthy, 
fl . h' 1·r 274 ouns mg ne. 
272. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 461-64. 
273. Id. at 412-28. 
274. See DWYER, supra note 224, at 186--88. 
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In short, the interests at stake for the newborn child in the initial parent-
age decision are greater than the interests at stake for unfit biological parents, 
so even if a balancing were appropriate, the child's constitutional right should 
trump the parental interest. As argued above, however, because the state 
properly acts solely as proxy for the child in choosing legal parents, considera-
tion of others' interests is out of bounds. Gratifying birth parents' desire to 
have a relationship with a child is not even a legitimate state interest in this 
context; it is not a proper basis for infringing a child's right to avoid a bad 
family relationship. It is difficult to say for certain, because the question simply 
does not present itself to courts, but it seems likely that if a state were to 
compel some other category of persons to be in a legal relationship without 
their consent and manifestly contrary to their welfare, it could not plausibly 
assert in its defense that it wanted to gratify the intense desire of the other 
person to be in the relationship. In some instances, forcing one adult to be in 
a relationship with another might on the whole be utility-maximizing, but we 
would deem it a great insult to the personhood of the former to force them 
into the relationship based on such a calculation. 
3. Birth Parents' Privacy Rights 
The state might also assert a privacy rationale in defending its failure to 
screen for unfit birth parents. To exclude unfit birth parents from legal par-
entage, it would have to identify them, which would entail collecting and 
using personal information. But as noted above, the state already collects the 
relevant information, and no court has deemed this to be an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy. States already use such information to sever parent-child 
relationships after it has created them. And obviously the state has a com-
pelling interest in identifying birth parents who are at very high risk of 
damaging any baby the state might place in their custody. 
Moreover, background checks are now routine for certain jobs and 
volunteer activities that involve interaction with children yet which pose 
much less risk ofharm.275 States today collect employment, banking, and other 
private information for the less compelling purpose of enforcing child support 
orders.276 An interesting recent legislative development in an analogous 
context is the International Marital Broker Regulation Act of 2005, which 
2 7 5. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Pennsylvania Child Abuse History 
Clearance Forms, http://www.dpw.state. pa.us/PartnersProviders/ChildW elfare/0036 71 038.htm {last 
visited Aug. 4, 2008) (setting forth requirements in Pennsylvania). 
276. See Kristen Campbell Johnson, Comment, Uncle Sam's Cure far Deadbeat Parents, 20 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 311,320 (2007). 
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requires agencies that facilitate marriage-anticipating relationships between 
American men and foreign women to conduct a criminal background check 
on their U.S. clients and to report the results to the women.277 That Act has 
thus far withstood constitutional challenge.278 In light of these other consti-
tutionally permissible incursions on individual privacy, adults' privacy rights 
should also pose no barrier to effectuating babies' substantive due process 
rights in connection with parentage. 
4. Popular Discomfort 
Opposition to the disqualification from legal parenthood that the consti-
tutional right under consideration would entail might rest simply on a 
discomfort with departing from existing practices.279 There is no constitutional 
purchase, however, to an objection that "we just don't like it." The Supreme 
Court has recognized in several contexts, especially those relating to family life, 
that "regulation of constitutionally protected decisions ... must be predicated 
on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the indi-
vidual has made .... Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause would be a nullity."180 Desegregation was downright frightening 
to great numbers of people, but that discomfort was not a legitimate basis for 
denying equal protection claims against de jure segregation. 
5. Adverse Maternal Reactions 
The most persuasive objection to excluding some birth parents from 
legal parenthood relates to child welfare-a concern that it could make 
children on the whole worse off. Specifically, some might conjecture that 
fear of having their babies taken away from them could cause some pregnant 
women to act in ways they otherwise would not. One of those ways might be 
entirely salutary: some might take greater steps to prevent further pregnancy 
277. Pub. L. No.109-162, §§ 831-33, 119 Stat. 2960,3066 (2006) (codified in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
278. See European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1369, 1380 
(N.D. Ga. 2007). 
279. Cf. David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of "Best Interests" Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 857, 879 (2006) ("[C]ourts are likely to demand something more than simply the state's 
discernment of a marginal advantage to a child from shifting parentage away from a figure widely 
regarded as a parent by social consensus."). 
280. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990) (citing decisions of the Court 
relating to prisoners' right to marry, inter-racial marriage, and abortion); see also id. at 452 ("[A] 
state interest in standardizing its children and adults, making the 'private realm of family life' 
conform to some state-designed ideal, is not a legitimate state interest at all."). 
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after having rights terminated as to a child or if they are substance abusers. 
Other possible reactions, though, would be undesirable from anyone's 
perspective. Women who do become pregnant and who fear being deemed 
unfit when they give birth might for that reason (a) have an abortion, (b) fail 
to get prenatal care because they fear medical facilities will report them to 
child protective services, or (c) give birth secretly in conditions unsafe for 
them and the baby. A court might plausibly find that the state has a com-
pelling interest in avoiding these things. The question would then be whether 
making unfit parents the legal parents and custodian of babies is an 
appropriate and narrowly tailored means of furthering that interest. 
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court has manifested 
reluctance to allow expectations of adverse private conduct to compromise 
individuals' constitutional rights. For example, in Palmore v. Sidoti,z81 the Court 
ruled that state trial courts, when deciding post-divorce child custody, may 
not consider the likelihood that a child would, if placed in the custody of a 
parent in an inter-racial relationship, suffer as a result of adverse community 
and peer reaction (for instance getting beat up on the school yard).zsz A court 
might readily distinguish Palmore, however, on the grounds that it involved 
race discrimination and the Court was concerned about the state giving effect 
to racist views. In contrast, taking into account adverse reactions by preg-
nant women would not create an impression that the state is condoning illicit 
behavior or attitudes; the state would simply be trying to do what is best, on 
the whole, for babies. 
If it is proper in this context to base a legislative choice on fear of such 
reactions, then the constitutionality of current parentage laws might well 
depend on what level of scrutiny courts apply, and accordingly whether 
children's right not to be consigned to unfit parents is fundamental. Under 
rational basis review, the courts would give legislatures the freedom to 
balance the competing considerations of babies' well being before and at birth 
with babies' well being after birth, without second guessing a legislature's evi-
dentiary support, wisdom, or carefulness. Under strict or rigorous scrutiny, 
however, courts should insist that states provide evidentiary support for the 
assumption that women will react in the feared ways, and demonstrate that 
they could not feasibly deter such reactions by means that do not entail infring-
ing constitutional rights of babies after birth. Without meaning to suggest 
that this is a simple matter or that there is an obvious conclusion to be drawn, 
I will offer reasons for believing that states could not meet this burden. 
281. 466 u.s. 429 (1984). 
282. Id. at 430,433. 
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First, the concern as stated draws no connection between harm to fetuses 
and denying legal parenthood to biological fathers, and it is quite unlikely a 
state could establish such a connection. This justification therefore could not 
save existing paternity laws from invalidation on constitutional grounds. It is 
not plausible to suggest that men concerned about being denied parental status 
would coerce expectant mothers to have an abortion, avoid prenatal care, or 
give birth in secret. Secrecy would in fact do little good for an unwed father, 
who would need the state to recognize him as the legal father before he could 
claim the rights and privileges of legal parenthood, and who is much less likely 
than a birth mother to be able to have a social relationship with a child absent 
such legal recognition. 
Second, concern that the possibility of being denied legal motherhood 
will alter pregnant women's behavior is mere speculation and has little or no 
evidentiary support. It is easy to find examples of people predicting or 
assuming that taking various legal actions against pregnant drug addicts will 
cause them to avoid health care facilities, but not so easy to find evidence 
demonstrating this actually to be true. Recall that, under current law, states 
sometimes do something with respect to newborns that, from the parents' 
perspective, is not much different from denial of parentage. Each year 
thousands of babies in the U.S. are taken into custody immediately after birth 
and placed in foster care, usually because of maternal drug addiction. 283 
Though this is only a small fraction of the children who are at high risk of 
maltreatment, it is common enough that women at risk of losing custody are 
likely to be aware of the possibility. Most such newborns are never placed in 
birth parents' custody, and many who are placed in a birth parent's custody 
are later removed.284 So the practical effect for the mother is similar to being 
denied legal parenthood in the first instance, the main difference being that 
hope of having custody of the child someday is held out for a longer period of 
time. Yet there is no reported evidence of women having abortions, avoiding 
prenatal care providers, or giving birth in secret because of this CPS practice. 
The legislative proposal I offer in the final part of the Article would 
change practices in three principle ways: (1) It would ensure CPS awareness 
of a greater number of at-risk babies. (2) It would preclude the state from 
investing legal parent status or custody in certain birth parents unless those 
birth parents initiate a fitness hearing and make a sufficient showing of their 
fitness. (3) If both birth parents are presumptively unfit, the state would, unless 
and until a birth parent initiates and succeeds in a fitness hearing, act on the 
283. Dwyer, supra note 2, at 445. 
284. See id. 
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assumption that the babies in question have no legal parents and will not enter 
into a relationship with their birth parents-in other words, that they are 
available for an initial legal relationship with other adults immediately at birth. 
These changes would make a substantial difference for children, but, as 
explained above, likely would not be so different for birth parents relative 
to current practices as to trigger a significant change in maternal behavior. 
Third, there are ways other than forcing newborns to be in relationships 
with unfit parents by which the state can serve its interests in minimizing the 
number of abortions and in ensuring that pregnant women receive prenatal 
care and give birth in licensed birthing facilities. A court applying strict 
scrutiny should insist that states try those other means instead, rather than 
infringing the rights of babies not to be consigned to unfit parents. One 
alternative way of addressing all three concerns would be to make rehabilita-
tion services available to pregnant women even if they do not currently have 
a child in the child protective system and to make the availability of those 
services known, by requiring abortion clinics to provide information to their 
patients about such services and by having CPS agencies publicize their avail-
ability. The availability of those services would signal to pregnant women 
that the social services agency stands ready to help them achieve parental 
fitness before giving birth, which would give them greater hope of avoiding or 
succeeding in a fitness hearing. 
In addition, states could alter pregnant women's incentive structures by 
including in civil and/or criminal definitions of child neglect failure to 
secure prenatal care and giving birth to a child in unsafe conditions. Such 
a failure could also be a factor weighing against a parent in a fitness hearing at 
the time of birth, so that if dysfunctional pregnant women were in fact as 
aware of the law and as strategic as some suppose, this might counteract any 
effect from fearing detection. A few states now treat prenatal drug exposure 
as civil or criminal child abuse or neglect, 285 so it would not be unprece-
dented to attach legal consequences to prebirth maternal behavior. 
Discussion of altering the incentives for pregnant women raises concern 
about an additional adult right-namely, pregnant women's personal 
freedom. However, the proposal I advance would not burden a woman's 
choice to have an abortion; indeed, the concern is that it would induce 
abortions, and the remedy I propose for that is simply to make services available 
to women contemplating abortion. The constitutional right to an abortion 
therefore would not be implicated. The abortion rights cases are nevertheless 
285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-503(12)(B){i)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2007); COLO. REV. 
STAT.§ 19-l-103(1)(a){VII) (2008). 
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relevant, because they establish that the state is permitted to limit pregnant 
women's freedom to some degree in order to further the state's legitimate 
interest in the health and safety of babies before their birth.286 Indeed, if the 
state may force women to remain pregnant once they enter the third trimester, 
then surely it may require them to visit a clinic a few times during a pregnancy 
and to give birth in a licensed facility. Doing so does not directly interfere 
with the procreative choice itself and is not a substantial burden on freedom; it 
is certainly much less of a burden than the responsibilities the law imposes on 
parents after a child is born. 
D. Summary 
States are not justified by any concern for adults' constitutional rights, 
natural law, or birth parents' interests in infringing the substantive due process 
right of newborn children not to be forced into relationships that are likely to 
be quite harmful to them, and concerns about adverse material reaction to an 
unfitness exception to maternity rules are unsubstantiated and better addressed 
by means other than ignoring unfitness. States can do much better than 
they currently are in effectuating children's rights with respect to parentage, 
and courts should require them to do so. The final Part of this Article briefly 
considers what a better approach to initial legal parentage might look like. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME 
OF PARENT AGE 
What, concretely, would it mean to effectuate the constitutional right of 
newborn babies that this Article has developed? The state cannot reasonably 
be expected to avoid every bad parentage decision. Courts should hold, 
however, that the constitutional rights of newborns require states at least to 
avoid the worst ones. Some fairly simple modifications to parentage statutes 
and related laws could address the vast majority of those cases. Addressing them 
properly requires both identifying them and responding appropriately to them. 
First, courts should require states to modify their parentage statutes to 
incorporate an unfitness exception for maternity and paternity and to allow for 
conferral of initial parentage on nonbiological parents. The unfitness exception 
would prevent the state from bestowing legal parentage on certain categories 
286. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007) (upholding a ban on partial 
birth abonions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 164-65 (1973) (upholding the right to abonion prior 
to a woman's third trimester but affirming the state's interest in the life of the fetus even prior to 
that time). 
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of birth parents, but also give those birth parents a statutory right to a fitness 
hearing. Precisely what sort of history or current conditions should be the basis 
for an exception could be worked out legislatively using the best available 
empirical information, but always from the perspective of respecting babies' 
constitutional right against the state forcing them into relationships with birth 
parents who the state knows present a substantial danger to a baby. For 
example, the maltreatment history bases might be limited to TPR or felony 
child maltreatment convictions within the past three years. The current 
condition bases might be limited to, for example, abuse of certain debilitating 
drugs or alcohol beyond a certain minimum amount, involuntary psychiatric 
commitment within the past two years, and imprisonment expected to last 
more than two years after a child's birth.287 
The statute would also direct courts in conducting fitness hearings, 
perhaps providing a list of factors to consider in assessing current fitness. Who 
carries what evidentiary burden in such hearings should be analyzed in terms 
of most effectively protecting the substantive interests and effectuating the 
rights of the children, not in terms of the rights of parents. Given the seri-
ousness of the factual triggers for a hearing, and assuming that the babies will 
be from the outset of life in the custody and care of other adults who wish to be 
their legal parents, the children's interests most likely point in favor of 
putting the burden on birth parents to show by a preponderance of evidence 
that they are now fit and willing to care for the child. The Supreme Court 
held in Santosky v. Kramer288 that in TPR proceedings states must bear the 
burden of proving unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. However, that 
ruling rested on assumptions that the parents involved are already in a rela-
tionship with a child and that the state is attempting to sever an existing 
parent-child bond,289 which would not be the case with a pre-parentage fitness 
287. An alternative approach to effectuating newborn children's substantive due process right 
as to parentage, and one more consistent with the traditional mindset and so more comfonable for 
couns and legislatures, would be to invest legal parent status in binh parents, as is currently done, but 
to require child protective services agencies to respond to the cross-checking and substance abuse 
reporting by immediately petitioning for TPR, thereby shifting the onus of initiating a fitness hearing 
from binh parents to the state. If a court orders the TPR, then the state-selected caregivers for the 
child would, correspondingly, petition for adoption under existing adoption laws rather than, as 
proposed below, for initial legal parenthood under amended parentage statutes. This approach is less 
desirable from the newborn's perspective because it continues to stack the deck unduly in favor of 
birth parents, and it invokes procedures associated conceptually with parental rights rather than 
children's rights, thus encouraging the human actors involved to continue to identify more with the 
birth parents than with the children, contrary to their proper role as proxies for the children, and 
thereby making more likely bad decisions and delays. 
288. 455 u.s. 745 (1982). 
289. Id . at 760, 769. 
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hearing. In addition, as noted in Part Ill, the Court has never presumed to 
dictate what constitutes parental unfitness, and proving by clear and 
convincing evidence the existence of the history or current condition that 
triggers the hearing under this proposal could itself be treated, consistent with 
Santosky, as a prima facie showing of unfitness that shifts the burden to the 
birth parents. Couns applying the Adoption and Safe Families Act-driven 
provisions for TPR without rehabilitation efforts have taken that approach.290 
Parentage laws should instruct courts that if a parent fails to meet this burden, 
they must deny the birth parents' petition for legal parent status, leaving the 
child's current caregivers free to petition to be the child's first legal parents. 
Second, states must take steps to ensure that they do not inadvertently 
confer legal parenthood on easily identifiable unfit parents. Assuming states 
will continue to establish legal parent-child relationships as to all newborns, 
they must create mechanisms for timely identification (before birth parents 
leave the birthing facility with a child) of the birth parents in the designated 
categories. This will require slight modification to birth reporting practices. 
Currently, birthing facilities report all births to a health or vital records agency 
of the state, but do so after birth occurs, sometimes weeks after. Instead, they 
should report expected births when expectant mothers arrive, and they should 
convey birth parent information to an agency that can cross-check that 
information against databases for past child maltreatment, criminal convic-
tions, and involuntary commitments to psychiatric facilities. Creating elec-
tronic reporting and cross-checking computer systems should not be difficult 
or costly. In addition, states should require universal testing for and reporting 
of newborn exposure to illegal drugs or alcohol. 
Third, states will need to create statutory mechanisms for dealing 
appropriately with newborns whose parents they identify as presumptively 
unfit through the reporting and cross-checking process. Statutes should direct 
whichever agency performs the cross-check to immediately notify the birthing 
facility of the parents' status, direct birthing facilities not to put those birth 
parents' names on the birth certificate application, and direct CPS agencies 
or birthing facilities to assume custody of the child (perhaps keeping the child 
in the hospital nursery). To ensure that identified birth parents who are in 
fact fit are not mistakenly precluded from legal parenthood, states might also 
implement measures to ensure that birth parents are informed of the need 
and opportunity for a fitness hearing if they wish to become legal parents 
to the child, of their right to be represented by an attorney, of contact 
290. See, e.g., State ex rei. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 849 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002). 
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information for experienced local attorneys, and of the state's willingness 
to pay for their attorney if they are poor. 
Though these changes would make a profound difference in the lives of 
thousands of children, they would not require great effort from, or additional 
resources for, agencies or courts. As noted above in Part lli.C, effectuating 
children's constitutional rights relating to parentage would simply require these 
institutions to take action much earlier in the lives of children born to 
unfit parents than they currently do. This earlier intervention would obviate 
the need for much more complex, prolonged, and costly interventions later 
in the children's lives. And it would substantially reduce the number of 
children who become damaged by maltreatment and thereafter drain the 
resources of the social welfare and criminal justice systems. 
One final question remains: How could the constitutional right argued 
for here ever be effectuated? After all, babies are in no position to assert a 
constitutional right against flawed parentage statutes. It would actually be 
easy. A facial challenge to parentage laws would not make sense, as courts 
would likely deem such laws consistent with babies' welfare in the vast majority 
of cases.291 However, an as-applied challenge should induce states to amend 
their parentage statutes to exclude the clearest cases of birth parent unfitness, 
as discussed above.292 The challenge could come in at least two forms. 
First, the guardian ad litem appointed to represent a child in a serious 
maltreatment case, or some other person or entity acting on behalf of a child 
who has been abused or neglected, could bring a claim for damages under 4 2 
U.S.C. § 1983, not against the child protection agency for failing to protect 
them (the sort of claim that failed in Des haney), but against the state for 
enacting and implementing statutes that consigned the child to a life with 
birth parents known at the time of the child's birth to be unfit and likely to 
abuse the child. Damages would not be awarded until the right had become 
clearly established, because of state actors' qualified immunity, but courts would 
l h l . . 29) ana yze t e c atm even m a test case. 
An alternative and cleaner avenue for advancing the constitutional right 
developed here would be for a representative of a baby just born or about to be 
born to petition for injunctive relief against application of the state's parentage 
291. Cf. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (stating that a plaintiff advancing a facial challenge to a 
statute must establish that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid" 
(quoting Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,514 (1990))). 
292. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,379 (1971) (stating that "a statute or a rule may 
be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected 
right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is 
beyond question"). 
293. Cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,841 n.S (1998). 
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statute to that baby. Social service agency workers are sometimes aware when 
an adult who previously had parental rights terminated as to another child is 
pregnant again, and some such persons might be motivated to ask the juvenile 
court to order guardian ad litem representation of the baby before (if state 
statutes allow for appointment to represent an unborn child) or immediately 
upon birth. Alternatively, one parent could seek to represent the child and 
advance the claim against the other parent, or any other relative or a child 
advocacy organization that is aware of the pending birth could seek "next 
friend" representative status and file suit. Such a claim for prospective relief, 
charging that the state will act unconstitutionally if it places the newborn baby 
into a legal family relationship with the birth parents, might make the best 
test case, because the question it would pose for a court would simply be "is this 
birth parent unfit to raise a child," rather than (as would be the case with a 
damages claim) "did state legislators act with deliberate indifference to the 
known unfitness of some birth parents (including this one)." 
CONCLUSION 
For the state to force any persons into intimate relationships that are 
very likely to be seriously detrimental to them is an unconstitutional abuse of 
state power, and never more so than when those persons are in the devel-
opmentally crucial period of infancy. Courts should recognize that newborn 
babies, much more clearly than birth parents, have fundamental interests at 
stake in the state's selection of legal parents and, therefore, a much stronger 
claim to constitutional protection. Attributing to newborns a substantive due 
process right against the state placing them into relationships with manifestly 
unfit birth parents would not require child protection agencies to do 
something entirely unprecedented as a practical matter. It would, however, 
force states to do something they have proven very resistant to doing-namely, 
to identify at the time of birth those babies at highest risk of maltreatment 
and to act expeditiously to ensure that better parentage decisions are made 
for them, thereby dramatically improving the infants' life prospects. Recogniz-
ing and effectuating this constitutional right of newborn children should 
also transform public attitudes and understandings about family formation, 
by highlighting the state's role in that process and its responsibility for 
the outcomes. 
